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I. Introduction
Varying Degrees of Culpability of Child Pornography Offenders
This adult defendant viewed child pornography in his home on his computer. He also
participated in electronic “chat room” sexual conversations with minor females. His sentencing
demands consideration of the manifold relevant differences among child pornography offenders.
Under the federal criminal code, child pornography viewing through computers is a serious
felony. The theory is that (1) computer depiction of children being sexually exploited creates a
permanent widespread record of abuse, perpetuating and potentially exacerbating the harm initially
suffered by the victim in the production, and (2) acquisition of these images encourages abuse of
children in their production since viewers create demand.
Prosecution under the current sentencing framework has largely failed to distinguish
among child pornography offenders with differing levels of culpability and danger to the
community. The applicable structure does not adequately balance the need to protect the public,
and juveniles in particular, against the need to avoid excessive punishment, with resulting
unnecessary cost to defendants’ families and the community, and the needless destruction of
defendants’ lives.
One of the foundational rules of our criminal justice system is that punishment should be
commensurate with the crime—its threat to society. The need to tailor sentences to the dangers
and needs of the individual being sentenced (and his family and community) are also foundational.
Proportionality in sentencing encourages a fair system.

Increasingly, judges, prosecutors,

advocates and concerned citizens have recognized that the current sentencing approach to child
pornography offenders is often unfair, unreasonable, cruel, and conceptually deficient.
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Child pornography offenders can be broadly divided into two main categories: those who
produce child pornography and those who are viewers of child pornography. By definition,
producers of child pornography are child molesters, frequently representing the worst and most
dangerous type of offender. Non-production offenders, by contrast, encompass a wide range of
individuals with varying degrees of culpability.

They include occasional viewers with no

particular sexual interest in children as compared to adults; viewers with pedophilic tendencies
who are aroused by images of minors but do not possess the intent or capacity to engage in any
sexual contact with a minor; users of peer-to-peer files who passively and unintentionally distribute
child pornography received on their computers; viewers who intentionally engage in the trafficking
of child pornography for economic or psychic gain; and viewers who have, intend to, or are likely
to, engage in sexual contact with a minor—i.e., actual or potential child molesters.
Child pornography viewing is played out against a primal parental fear of pedophiles
harming their children. While there is a degree of overlap between child pornography viewers and
child molesters, most non-production child pornography offenders—and particularly the one now
before the court for sentencing—show no mens rea suggesting the likelihood of future harm to
children.
The Internet revolution has vastly increased the availability and accessibility of child
pornography online, greatly expanding the category of people arrested for possession and
distribution offenses involving explicit sexual images of minors obtained through home computers
using various peer-to peer file sharing programs. As a result there has been an enormous increase
in this criminal class, governmental resources used to ferret out its members, criminal
prosecutions, and incarcerations.
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Prosecutions and sentencing should differentiate among offenders’ varying degrees of
culpability. Failure to distinguish among the multitude of vectors involved in a sentencing decision
is particularly grave in the field of child pornography offenses.

To be adjudicated guilty

necessarily results in denomination as a sex offender; automatically provided is a lifetime of
continuous punishment—being marked as a pariah with severe restrictions on residence,
movements, activities and associations. Adding unnecessary, unduly long, periods of incarceration
is inappropriate and it should be avoided.
In order to deliver reasonable sentences for child pornography offenses, a detailed recategorization and typology of offenders is warranted. The divisions below offer a tentative
illustration of one possible taxonomy. Each category implies different mental states, which need
to be considered when tailoring appropriate punishment and measures for control.


Possession-only child pornography users: This category includes those viewers and
consumers of child pornography who download images of child pornography. It frequently
includes individuals with the lowest degree of culpability. Often, defendants in this
category do not have the mens rea threatening actual contact with a minor.



Possession and involuntary distribution: This category comprises those individuals who
possess child pornography they downloaded and are deemed to have engaged in
distribution due to the nature of the technology used for downloading the images. The
individuals in this category may not intend to distribute child pornography. For example,
this category would include child pornography users who download images via peer-topeer file sharing sites which may render files automatically accessible to others.



Possession with intentional distribution: This category comprises those individuals who
possess and intentionally distribute child pornography to other users, but not for
3

commercial gain. Offenders in this category display a higher degree of culpability; the
trade and exchange of such images significantly contributes to the child pornography
market, perpetuating the severe harm suffered by children in production.


Possession with intentional distribution for commercial gain:

This category

encompasses individuals who profit from the trade in child pornography. This conduct is
extremely serious. It not only contributes to the existence of the market, but defendants in
this category tend to be driven by unchecked pecuniary concerns rather than a mental
illness amenable to curative medical treatment.


Online communications with minors without intent to engage in contact:

This

category includes those child pornography users who view child pornography while
concurrently engaging in online communications with minors, without the intention, or
with little or no likelihood, to engage in any physical contact with them. The adverse effect
on the child of such inappropriate conduct may be serious.


Online communications with minors intending to engage in contact: This category
represents individuals with a high degree of culpability. They possess the mens rea that is
likely to lead to actual contact with minors. Individuals falling within this category
represent a serious risk to the public. The contact ranges from talk to coitus.



Production of child pornography: Defendants in this category engaged in, and are most
likely to engage in the future, in the sexual exploitation of a minor. This group potentially
constitutes a most serious and dangerous category of child pornography offenders.
Defendants in this category can be further differentiated based on factors such as the type
of images produced, the quantity, and their role in the production.
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Some involve

photographing rapes of young children by a parent and other relatives or friends of the
family. Such incestuous relationships are particularly hard to ferret out.
While the current Guidelines for child pornography offenses appear to recognize most of
these broad categories, several of the Commission’s relevant sentencing enhancements tend to
apply indiscriminately to all child pornography offenders, greatly increasing the recommended
punishment range without necessarily reflecting an individual’s heightened level of culpability.
See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Federal Child Pornography Offenses (Dec. 2012), at 320-21
(recognizing that “[t]he current sentencing scheme . . . places a disproportionate emphasis on
outmoded measures of culpability regarding offenders’ collections,” and recommending that the
Guidelines be revised to “more fully account” for: the content of an offender’s child pornography
collection and nature of his collecting behavior; the degree of the offender’s involvement with
child pornography communities; and an offender’s history of “sexually dangerous behavior.”).
Consistency in Sentencing
This court has been attempting to rationalize its own sentences by establishing general
criteria for ‘similar’ cases, a project required by the wide discretion in sentencing afforded under
Booker. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); United States v. Chin Chong, 13-CR570, 2014 WL 4773978 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2014) (accounting for prospect of deportation when
imposing a term of incarceration); United States v. Sarpong, 14-CR-242, 2014 WL 5363775, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2014) (same); United States v. Palaguachy, 14-CR-0184, 2014 WL 6606668,
at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2014) (same); United States v. Florez Parra, 14–CR–332, 2015 WL
105885, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2015) (same); see also United States v. Bannister, 786 F. Supp.
2d 617, 688 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (sentencing nine defendants together for internal consistency and
reassurance to community); United States v. C.R., 972 F. Supp. 2d 457, 459 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)
5

(problems with enforcing statutory minimums); United States v. D.M., 942 F. Supp. 2d 327
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (sentencing defendant who pled guilty to one count of possession of child
pornography to five years’ probation); United States v. G.L., 305 F.R.D. 47 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
(“With the increase in sentencing discretion and concern over unnecessarily long incarcerations
has come an increased need for each judge to try to avoid inconsistency in his or her own sentences.
Stating reasons for sentencing in memoranda helps minimize both dangers.”).
Defendant in Instant Case
Defendant R.V., a loving father of two adult children and three school-age children, pled
guilty to one count of a five-count indictment for possession of child pornography. Over a period
of about one year, defendant downloaded child pornography in the privacy of his home without
the knowledge of his wife or children. Defendant also engaged in video chats with minor females.
No evidence was presented of defendant ever having had inappropriate physical sexual
contact with a minor. Expert testimony demonstrated that defendant poses no further danger to
his or other children. In light of his children’s and spouse’s demonstrated need for his presence at
home, imposed was a sentence of time-served of five days, and seven years of strict supervised
release with medical treatment. Levied was: a fine of $12,500; $2,000 in victim’s restitution; and
a $100 special assessment.
II. Facts and Procedural History
The parties stipulated that the defendant should be referred to as “R.V.” to enhance
rehabilitation and reduce adverse impact on the family. See Hr’g Tr., Apr. 30, 2015 (“Sent. Hr’g”)
at 27:17-28:1.
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Background
R.V., age 52, is a United States citizen and resident of Brooklyn, New York. Presentence
Investigation Report, Oct. 17, 2014 (“PSR”), at 2.
Born in Puerto Rico, he grew up in humble circumstances. His father was a farmer; his
mother, a homemaker. Id. at ¶ 39. Though most of his fourteen siblings were already grown up
and living out of the home when R.V. was a child, he shares close relationships with his surviving
eleven brothers and sisters who live in North Carolina. Id. at ¶ 40.
At age three or four, R.V. and his family immigrated to New York. Richard B. Krueger,
Psychiatric and Risk Assessment (“Krueger Letter”), at 1. They relied on public assistance. Id. at
2. By ninth grade, R.V. had dropped out of school in order to work to help support the family.
PSR at ¶ 52. When he was eighteen, defendant married his first wife; they divorced after one year.
Id. at ¶ 41.
At age eighteen, defendant began to use marijuana. Krueger Letter at 2. He subsequently
moved to cocaine and then to heroin. Id. He entered an inpatient treatment program, but relapsed.
Id. at ¶ 51.
In 1991, at age 29, R.V. pled guilty to charges of attempting to sell cocaine. Id. at ¶¶ 3132. He entered a drug treatment program and was released on parole. Id. at ¶ 51; Krueger Letter
at 3. After a positive urine test for controlled substances, he was incarcerated for violation of
parole, during which time he completed another drug treatment program. PSR at ¶ 51; Krueger
Letter at 3. Following his release, R.V. was transferred to a Phoenix House inpatient treatment
program for three months where he successfully completed another drug treatment program. PSR
at ¶ 51. He reports that he has been sober since May 1, 1995; over 20 years. Id. at ¶ 50; Krueger
Letter at 3.
7

In 2000, at age 38, the defendant married his current wife, then age 21. PSR at ¶ 9; Krueger
Letter at 3. The couple subsequently had three children: a son (age 15), a daughter (age 12), and
a daughter (age 10). PSR at ¶ 42. His son, after homeschooling, recently enrolled in public school;
his two young daughters remain homeschooled by defendant’s wife, who holds a college degree.
Id.; Krueger Letter at 5. Defendant refers to his marriage as “great.” Krueger Letter at 5. His
wife describes him as a wonderful husband and father, who cooks for the family almost every
night. PSR at ¶ 44.
Defendant also has two adult daughters (ages 24 and 26) from a previous unmarried
relationship; they live in upstate New York. Id. at ¶ 43.
Following his arrest in the instant case, defendant was required to live separately from his
family. Id. at ¶ 45; Krueger Letter at 3. He was permitted to return home after completion of an
investigation by the New York Administration for Children Services (“ACS”). ACS found that
none of R.V.’s children had been abused by him. PSR at ¶ 45.
Both of R.V.’s parents died from health-related problems. Id. at ¶ 39. Each of his surviving
eleven siblings is gainfully employed and enjoys good health. Id. at ¶ 40. Each maintains a close
relationship with R.V. and continues to remain supportive following his arrest. Id.
R.V. has worked in a variety of restaurants: as an assistant manager of a restaurant chain’s
warehouse; and, for the last five years, as a production manager of another restaurant chain, where
he supervised approximately 20 people and earned some $75,000 a year. His employment was
terminated upon his arrest in the instant case. Id. at ¶¶ 54-55; Krueger Letter at 1.
At the time of sentencing, he was employed by a bakery in Long Island City. Hr’g Tr.,
Apr. 1, 2015, at 16:20-17:2.
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Sexual History
Defendant’s first “crush” occurred at age 15, on a 15-year-old female. Krueger Letter at
5. He went on his first “date” at age 18 with an 18-year-old female. Id. His first non-genital
touching, or petting, occurred at age 19 with a 19-year-old female. Id. Defendant’s first genital
sexual encounter occurred at age 19 with the mother, also then 19 years old, of his oldest two
children. Id.
R.V. has had three sexual partners—the mother of his oldest two children, his first wife,
and his current wife. Id. He reported in a June 2014 medical interview that his last ten
masturbatory fantasies involved adult women. Id. He reports that his sexual relationship with his
current wife is satisfactory, but at times his wife is tired and not interested in sexual intercourse
when he is. Id. at 3.
The defendant has viewed adult pornography intermittently for many years on his home
computer in private, downloading and masturbating to such images. Id. at 3-4. For the year prior
to his arrest, he viewed and masturbated to images and videos on his computer of girls aged 11 to
12 years old. PSR at ¶¶ 5-7.
Child Pornography
Defendant admitted to agents from the Department of Homeland Security, who executed a
search warrant of his home, that he used peer-to-peer electronic file-sharing software to search,
obtain, and view child pornography. Id. at ¶ 7. After viewing the images or videos, he would
either delete the files from his computer or he would move them to “free space” on his computer.
Id.
He used peer-to-peer software to engage in video conversations with minor females using
web applications “KiK” and “Ares.” Id. at ¶ 8. In “chat rooms,” he posed as a teenage boy between
9

the ages of 14 to 17 to engage girls in a “sexual manner.” Id. He also admitted to occasionally
watching and recording chat rooms in which minor females were performing sexual acts. Id.
On December 20, 2013, a Homeland Security Investigations agent, engaged in an ongoing
investigation, connected to R.V.’s home computer. Id. at ¶ 5. The agent downloaded four files:


a photograph depicting an adult male engaging in a sexual act with a five-year-old girl;



a one minute and seventeen second video depicting an adult male engaging in a sexual act
with a three-year-old girl;



a twenty-four second video depicting two nude twelve-year-old girls touching an adult
male’s penis and each other; and



a three minute and twenty-four second video depicting an adult male engaging in a sexual
act with a prepubescent girl.

Id.
On May 1, 2014, agents from the Department of Homeland Security, executing a search
warrant at R.V.’s home, located three separate thumb drives that defendant admitted belonged to
him. Id. at ¶¶ 6-7. Most of the files found on the thumb drives were password protected, but
agents were able to recover nine images and twenty-two videos depicting child pornography. Id.
Arrest
On May 2, 2014, R.V. was arrested for possession of child pornography. R.V.’s three
youngest children and his wife were all residing at their home when he was arrested. Id. at ¶ 9.
He was in jail for five days before he was released on bail. Order of Detention, May 2, 2014, ECF
No. 3; Order Setting Conditions of Release, May 7, 2014, ECF No. 8 (sealed). Charged was that,
on May 2, 2014, R.V. knowingly and intentionally possessed images of child pornography that
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were mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. See 18 U.S.C. §§
2252(a)(4)(B), 2252(b)(2).
Mental Health Treatment
After release on bail R.V. was treated by Mustard Seed Forensic Social Work Services
(“Mustard Seed”), which provides sex offenders with treatments aimed at “the reduction of deviant
sexual behavior and recidivism.” Mustard Seed Forensic Licensed Clinical Social Work Services,
P.C., http://www.mustardseedforensic.com/msmission.html. Since its inception, Mustard Seed
has treated over 3,000 sex offenders. Mustard Seed Client Compliance Report, Ct. Ex. 2, April 1,
2015, at 1.
Provided to the court was a report by William C. Ford, a licensed clinical social worker
and executive director and co-founder of Mustard Seed. Id.; Credentials of William C. Ford, Ct.
Ex. 3, Apr. 1, 2015. Dr. Ford is a member of the National Association of Social Workers, and the
Association for the Advancement of Social Work with Groups; a board member of Stop It Now!,
a “national organization dedicated to ending child abuse;” and former member of the New York
City Department of Probation’s Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault Task Force. Id. During
Ford’s fifteen-year professional career, he has treated approximately 3,500 sex offenders. Id.
Dr. Ford spoke directly about R.V.’s participation in treatment and his potential for relapse.
Recidivism was unlikely if adequate medical treatment was afforded:
[R.V.] has been a willing and open participant in treatment thus far.
He has played an active role in his own relapse prevention planning
and has taken only assertive actions to address the steps he took to
commit the instant offense. He has been willing to take an active
role in his self-disclosure regarding all aspects of his sexual
behavior. When asked what his expectation of treatment was he
simply stated that he would like to develop the skills needed to
remain relapse free and to no longer succumb to desires that would
lead to him engaging in criminal or sexually deviant behavior.
11

Based upon his personal assessment regarding his motivation to
participate in treatment, this immediate treatment goal was
identified. [R.V.] would like to identify and correct the root causes
of his involvement in the sexual offense.
We believe that [R.V.] has thus far benefited from his time in
treatment. He has taken advantage of this opportunity to address his
behavior and has become far more focused on his personal risk
factors. Based on [R.V.’s] commitment to treatment and his ability
to work on improving his recognition of his personal high risk
factors he appears capable [of] maintaining non-relapse behavior.
The prognosis for non-recidivism, thus far, appears to be good.
Mustard Seed Client Compliance Report, April 1, 2015, Ct. Ex. 2, at 3 (emphasis added).
Emphasized was that R.V. was actively engaging in treatment:
[R.V.] has engaged actively to improve his level of awareness and
insight regarding the steps he took to engage in a sexually deviant
act as well as to improve his recognition of his actions and to
heighten his awareness of the impact of his actions. [R.V.] has
begun to exhibit recognition as to how his actions may be perceived
and he agrees with this perception. He openly identifies that his
actions could cause long term damage to any female subjected to
exploitation via child porn. He has since refrained from any
behavior that may be perceived as criminal or harmful. . . .
[R.V.] presents himself as an easily approached and willingly
engaged individual who has lived an active and vibrant life to date.
He was easily engaged in discussions regarding the instant offense
as well as all areas of his sexual life. Based upon his responses
during sessions [R.V.] appears [to have] improve[d] his insight and
judgment regarding what constitutes sexually deviant behavior as
well as its impact on its victims. [R.V.] maintains that he does not
currently, and has not since his arrest, engage[d] in sexually deviant
behavior.
We remain convinced that early intervention with individuals
involved in sexually inappropriate behavior at this level serves as an
excellent deterrent to any progression of sexually deviant behavior
and can result in long term relapse prevention as well as
rehabilitation of the individual involved in treatment. Therefore we
believe that [R.V.], if given the chance to, can benefit from
community based treatment to address his involvement in the
commission of a sexually deviant act.
12

Id. (emphasis added).
Administration for Children Services
After R.V.’s arrest, the Administration for Children Services (“ACS”) of New York filed
an Article 10 petition in the Kings County Family Court to protect his children; it opened an
investigation into whether R.V. had abused them or posed a danger to them. See Sent. Mem., April
9, 2015, ECF No. 43 (sealed), at 1-2, Ex. A. ACS found no evidence of abuse; R.V. was permitted
to return home to reside with his family on August 29, 2014. PSR at ¶ 11; Sent. Mem., April 9,
2015, ECF No. 43 (sealed), at 1, Ex. D; Hr’g Tr., Apr. 1, 2015, 94:18-20. The record from the
Family Court was admitted in evidence under seal. See Sent. Mem., April 9, 2015, ECF No. 43
(sealed). There have been no reported violations; the petition was dismissed by the Family Court
on May 6, 2015. Letter update as to [R.V.], June 10, 2015, ECF No. 51 (sealed).
Beginning with his initial release from custody on May 7, 2014 until sentencing on April 30,
2015, Pre–Trial Services closely monitored defendant. See Order Setting Conditions of Release,
May 7, 2014, ECF No. 8 (sealed). The conditions of supervision included the following: defendant
must remain within New York City; he must avoid areas where minors under the age of 18 tend to
congregate, including but not limited to, parks, playgrounds, fast food restaurants near schools and
arcades; he must undergo mental health evaluation and treatment as needed for the specific offense
charged; and he must refrain from using a computer or accessing the Internet, except as may be
necessary for employment purposes only. Id.
Guilty Plea
On August 26, 2014, the defendant appeared before a magistrate judge and pled guilty to
one count of a five-count indictment. See Hr’g Tr., Aug. 26, 2014, ECF No. 29, at 23:22-24:2.
13

Specifically, defendant pled guilty to possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2252(a)(4)(B), which provides as follows:
Any person who . . . knowingly possesses, or knowingly accesses
with intent to view, 1 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films,
video tapes, or other matter which contain any visual depiction that
has been mailed or has been shipped or transported using any means
or facility of interstate or foreign commerce . . . by any means
including by computer if the producing of such visual depiction
involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct
and such visual depiction is of such conduct.
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2012). The maximum term of imprisonment for this crime is twenty
years. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2) (2012) (minors under 12 years old). There is no minimum
sentence.
Defendant raised no constitutional or other challenge to the procedures by which the
evidence was obtained. See generally Hr’g Tr., Aug. 26, 2014, ECF No. 29. It was explained to
defendant that a mandatory supervised release term of five years was applicable. Id. at 13:9-12.
He understood that he would be treated as a sexual offender under state and federal law with
serious adverse long term collateral consequences. Id. at 18:25-19:7.
III. Experts
Evidentiary sentencing hearings were conducted on April 1 and April 30, 2015. See ECF
Nos. 48-49.
A. Medical
Dr. Richard B. Krueger, a psychiatrist who specializes in paraphilic disorders, evaluated
the defendant in a four-hour interview on June 23, 2014. Hr’g Tr., Apr. 1, 2015, at 38:16-41:23.
He took a detailed history of defendant’s personal and family background, which included a stable
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upbringing, some financial struggles, and substance abuse. Id. at 42:12-43:3, 44:18-45:4; see
generally Krueger Letter.
Dr. Krueger wrote an expert report and testified twice. See generally Krueger Letter; Hr’g
Tr., Apr. 1, 2015; Sent. Hr’g. He also reviewed a list of materials that this court advised it was
considering in sentencing. See Order, April 29, 2015, ECF No. 46; Sent. Hr’g, at 15:19-21, 19:714. Dr. Krueger suggested that the court consider three additional sources: Martin P. Kafka,
Hypersexual Disorder: A Proposed Diagnosis of DSM-V, 39 Archives of Sexual Behavior 377400 (2010) (discussing the proposed revision of the DSM-V to include hypersexual disorder); Meg
S. Kaplan & Richard B. Krueger, Diagnosis, Assessment, and Treatment of Hypersexuality, 47
Journal of Sex Research 181 (2010) (discussing the current standard for diagnosis, assessment,
and treatment of hypersexual disorder); Richard B. Krueger, Meg S. Kaplan & Michael B. First,
Sexual and Other Axis I Diagnoses of 60 Males Arrested for Crimes Against Children Involving
the Internet, 14 CNS Spectrums 623 (2009) (discussing the newly suggested category of
hypersexual disorder as the sexual diagnoses of 60 males arrested for possession of child
pornography obtained via the Internet or attempting to meet a child over the Internet). Sent. Hr’g,
at 19:11-20:5.
1. Credentials
Dr. Krueger graduated from Harvard Medical School in 1977. Hr’g Tr., Apr. 1, 2015, at
38:20-21. His experience in assessing paraphilic disorders began in the mid-1980’s, while working
at the Massachusetts Treatment Center in the Bridgewater Correctional Complex, where he
assessed approximately one hundred individuals civilly committed for sexual violence. Id. at 39:915. For the past twenty years, he has served as the medical director of the Sexual Behavior Clinic
at New York Psychiatric Institute in New York City. Id. at 39:20-22. As director, he runs the
15

psychobehavior clinic, which assesses juvenile sex offenders. Id. at 40:3-7. He also is a consultant
to the New York State Office of Mental Health, where he assesses and treats sex offenders. Id. at
40:8-13. The doctor is currently engaged in helping rewrite the Paraphilic Disorder chapter in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. Id. at 40:14-21.
On several occasions Dr. Krueger has been qualified as an expert on paraphilic disorders
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Id. at 41:17-23. He has
testified on the risk assessment of sex offenders and the treatment of individuals with paraphilic
disorders. Id.
2. Methodology and Diagnosis
Dr. Krueger performed twenty-one tests to assess defendant’s mental condition and sexual
tendencies. Krueger Letter at 6-9. These tests were designed to explore pedophilic tendencies,
other sexual interests, repulsions and attractions, mental illness, and risk assessment for sexual
recidivism and sexual violence. Id.
The majority of the tests indicated that defendant:


“[D]id not make use of [rapist] cognitions.” Id. at 7, ¶ 5;



“[D]id not make use of [pedophilic] cognitions.” Id. at 7, ¶ 6;



Was not “compulsive” in his use of pornography. Id. at 7, ¶ 7.



Is at “low . . . risk of recidivism . . .” Id. at 11.



“[N]ever abused a child in a hands on way.” Id.



“[I]s at low risk to his children . . .” Id.

The tests indicated that defendant’s risk of sexually abusing his own children was “low”
or “extremely low.” Id. at 12; see also Hr’g Tr., Apr. 1, 2015, at 46:22-24 (“I applied a number of
risk assessment instruments and these were low—his scores on these were lower, extremely low
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on these five instruments). Dr. Krueger also testified that the risk of R.V. abusing children other
than his own was “remote.” Id. at 47:10-14. In sum, Dr. Krueger provided the following diagnoses
concerning the defendant:
Axis I:

1. . . . Pedophilia, with an interest in images of
children only
2. Opiate dependence with sustained remission in an
uncontrolled environment
3. Cocaine dependence with sustained remission in
an uncontrolled environment

Axis II:

No diagnosis

Axis III:

1. Elevated cholesterol

Axis IV:

Stressors—severe—current legal situation

Axis V:

Highest level of functioning past year was 90
Highest level of functioning past week was 60

Krueger Letter at 11.
3. Findings
a. Transition to Child Pornography
Dr. Krueger testified to the defendant’s transition from viewing adult pornography to child
pornography, and the further progression to engaging in online chats with underage girls:

THE COURT:

When did he start looking at [pornography]?

THE WITNESS:

. . . I didn’t give a specific time. He said that
he had looked at it on and off for many years,
and that . . . he would download it, masturbate
to it, but that it was only within the past year
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that he had looked [at] child pornography.
He stumbled on it and began viewing it.
Hr’g Tr., Apr. 1, 2015, at 47:21-48:3. This expert also testified that, about the same time,
defendant began chatting online with underage girls:

THE COURT:

He started having chats with underage
children – girls, I assume?

THE WITNESS:

Yes.

THE COURT:

When?

THE WITNESS:

Around that time.

THE COURT:

A year before?

THE WITNESS:

Yes, around – coincident with his interest in
his use of child pornography.

THE COURT:

And what brought on this change in his
lifestyle?

THE WITNESS:

He just said he stumbled onto it and began
using it. I would say this is not an infrequent
– it’s a strange – to try to establish how
somebody develops a sexual interest pattern
is – the explanation is in its infancy really.
But he – basically, this is not an unusual
history for many who have looked at child
pornography. You get elderly men who for
many years have had sexual relationships
and/or looked at pornography, and then for
some reason, they’ll migrate into this and –
as opposed to getting out of it, will continue
with it, and this was his pattern.

THE COURT:

You have no opinion on what caused this
sexual reversion, if that’s the proper word?

THE WITNESS:

No, aside from shifting into it and finding –
becoming interested in it to the point that he
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would masturbate, no opinion – no opinion as
to what caused it.
THE COURT:

But I don’t understand the connection
between that and his chatting with women?

THE WITNESS:

Well, he – one could say that he – if he’s
interested in images of minor females,
prepubescent females, he indicated that he
posed I think as a teenager and began
engaging in chats with minor females. This
would be, I would say, an extension of his
interest involving – of his interest –
vesicatory interest in minor females, he
presumably would find it sexually titillating
or interesting to be another facet of that
interest pattern.

THE COURT:

Is that a normal progression for these people
who – is that a normal progression from child
pornography through computers into chats
with young women?

THE WITNESS:

I would say it’s one progression. It’s – you
can find individuals who have – will just stick
with images and that’s it, alone. You’ll have
some individuals who will move to chatting
and stop at that.
You’ll have other
individuals that will look at pornography and
go to chatting and then actually try to meet or
actually abuse one.

THE COURT:

What is the percentage of those who go from
pornography, child pornography, who as you
say, have drifted into it, into chats with young
ladies – young women, I should say, young
females, I guess?

THE WITNESS:

Offhand, I don’t know. I would say it would
be a relatively small proportion, but I don’t
have specific numbers.

THE COURT:

And what proportion of that proportion drifts
into physical relationships, not necessarily
sexual?
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THE WITNESS:

Well, again, I think that it would be relatively
small. I mean, I think of the – let me just
think. This would be basically a question –
some questions for literature review – but to
my best knowledge, individuals who are
arrested for child pornography, a relatively
small portion of them will have additional
charges involving – additional prior charges
involving abuse of minors, relatively small
portion.

Id. at 48:17-51:5 (emphasis added).
Dr. Krueger testified that defendant’s transition to watching child pornography “is not an
unusual pattern.” Id. at 80:22-23. He explained:
I have evaluated on the order of 350 individuals involved with child
pornography or psychosexual interaction. Most[ly] all of them are
male. And in a substantial portion of cases, individuals have had,
you know, by all external appearances, they’re doing fine, and this
is the index of their first crime. And they – a substantial portion
have been elderly men – thirties, forties, fifties, sixties – that just
become taken by it.
Id. at 80:23-81:5.
The internet age increased the volume and accessibility of child pornography:
THE WITNESS:

I mean, there’s been much written about this.
You have pornography.
Where is
pornography viewed at? It’s viewed in the
privacy of one’s home. So you can instantly
get it. You can sort of do it privately. You
can think of doing it. Nobody’s really
looking at it. So the situation for looking at
pornography is secretive and it’s very
accessible. And you know, that’s how – I
mean, we’re getting all sorts of cases of
individuals that sort of zero in on
pornography and the most bizarre things you
can possibly imagine, but they do it, you
know, privately, so to speak.
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THE COURT:

Is that partially due to the availability on the
internet –

THE WITNESS:

Yes.

THE COURT:

– within privacy, which I take it is a relatively
recent innovation?

THE WITNESS:

Absolutely. And the whole evolution of
pornography on the internet is a relatively
recent thing. There have been increasing
amounts written as to how pervasive it is and
extensive it is, and there’s a vast myriad of
pornography. People think that they are
looking at it and nobody’s looking at them.

THE COURT:

So it increased from the period, I suppose,
when you would have to look at cards or
photographs and go out and get them?

THE WITNESS:

Yes. I mean, there used to be you had print
pornography of all sorts everywhere. And I
think there’s been a discussion that since with
the advent of the sort of video camera and
then online, there’s been an incredible
explosion of child pornography – well, of
pornography and child pornography, people
being arrested for child pornography. This is
a function of the sort of the internet age.

Id. at 83:18-85:1.
According to Dr. Krueger, such easy access and increased availability of child pornography
online could also affect the deterrent value of heavy sentences:
THE COURT:

Well, from a medical point of view, given the
general circumstances of availability and
perhaps desire in the general population, do
the deterrent effects of heavy sentences have
an impact of any substantial nature on the
number of people who will be violating this
law? . . .

THE WITNESS:

Well, I would say that the deterrent effect is
minimized by virtue of the mechanics of the
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internet, that basically people are in their
home, alone, kind of thinking they’re private
– privacy and they click and they, you know,
they feel somewhat uncomfortable, but it’s
not like they – it’s just so easy to do, so easy
to do that. I’m not sure that the deterrent
effect is affecting such behavior.
Id. at 91:20-92:10.
b. No Physical Threat to Children
The expert noted there was no evidence that defendant had engaged in hands-on abuse of
any child:
[R.V.’s] acquisition of child pornography appears to have occurred
over a relatively brief period of time. It also appears that his
predominate sexual preference has been for adult females. There is
no indication that he has ever tried to meet or abuse a minor and
his risk of doing so is low or extremely low according to 5
instruments used to assess such risk.
Krueger Letter at 12 (emphasis added).
Specifically, Dr, Krueger indicated that:
[T]here was no indication that [R.V.] had even attempted or
fantasized about his children or that he had abused his children, and
in my opinion, he could live with his children without placing his
children at risk. . . . I applied a number of risk assessment
instruments and these were low – his scores on these were lower,
extremely low on these five instruments.
Id. at 46:18-24 (emphasis added); see also Krueger Letter at 11. With a “reasonable degree of
medical certainty,” the defendant could live at home without posing a danger to his children. Hr’g
Tr., Apr. 1, 2015, at 54:24-25.
[COUNSEL]:

Dr. Krueger, in your expert medical opinion
is [R.V.] a danger to his children?

[THE WITNESS]:

He is not a danger to his children.

Id. at 63:16-63:18 (emphasis added); see also id. at 55:7-11.
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The expert also testified that R.V. is not a threat to other children:
[COUNSEL]:

In your expert medical opinion, do you
believe that [R.V.] is a danger to other
children?

[THE WITNESS]:

[I]n my opinion, he is not a danger to other
children.

Id. at 63:19-22 (emphasis added); see also id. at 47:10-14.
c. Recidivism Risk
The expert testified that in most cases involving viewers of child pornography the
recidivism rate is low. Id. at 53:11-17. In this expert’s opinion, this conclusion applied to
defendant R.V. Id. at 53:19-21.
As noted above, Dr. Krueger’s tests showed that defendant’s risk of sexual violence and
re-offense was “low” or “extremely low.” Krueger Letter at 12; Hr’g Tr., April 1, 2015, at 46:2224. Moreover, according to Dr. Krueger, R.V.’s recidivism risk would decrease further if he were
allowed to continue treatment under federal supervision as part of a non-custodial sentence:
[COUNSEL:]

So in 95 to 97 percent of cases, once someone
is arrested for child pornography, they don’t
go back to looking at it?

[THE WITNESS:]

I would say ballpark. I mean, again, there are
some meta-analyses and other things. I didn’t
review them immediately before this, but
they are on that order. I would say the rate of
recidivism, depending on the length of time,
is on the order of three to five percent.
...

THE COURT:

And is that applicable to this defendant?

THE WITNESS:

Yes. I would say that many of those studies
that have been done basically just
contemplate[] the intervention of the legal
system only. It’s not clear what percent have
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been involved in treatment or what percent
are not involved in treatment or what the
nature of supervision is.
So I think that these additional factors, if he
were to receive a community – non-custodial
sentence, he would have federal supervision.
He would have treatment. This would have a
very substantial impact upon decreasing this
risk.
THE COURT:

That’s lower than the three to five percent?

THE WITNESS:

Much lower, yes. I would characterize his
risk as remote if he continues in treatment.
Anyway, I would characterize it as remote,
but even more remote if he continues in
treatment under federal supervision.

Hr’g Tr., Apr. 1, 2015, at 53:11-54:12 (emphasis added); see also Krueger Letter at 12 (“This risk
would be reduced even further by participation in and completion of a sex offender specific
program, and by the usual conditions of monitoring by federal probation in the community.”).
4. Recommendation for Sentence
In recommending a non-incarceratory sentence, the expert testified to the significance of
the ACS investigation in making the determination that R.V. posed no danger to his own children:
THE WITNESS:

Well, so the issue is, did he abuse his kids? .
. . Child Protection Services was doing an
evaluation, and they concluded no abuse
indicated. That’s a very powerful thing. We
refer to . . . at the clinic . . . Child Protection
Services all the time. We deal with them a
lot. If they concluded it hasn’t happened,
that’s the best you can get. With . . . a Family
Court petition, I don’t know. I mean, if there
were concerns – they must have been
concerned about some criminality and – but
this seems to be in abeyance. So it seems to
me the way the evidence is, he did not abuse
his children. Even if he had – and we
regularly will deal with basically cases where
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individuals have abused their children, the
issue is whether they can be reunited with
their children and have unsupervised contact.
His wife is reliable – appears [to] be a reliable
reporter. His children are of age that they
could outcry, and he’s in a therapeutic
environment at Mustard Seed that is going to
be . . . very attentive to these issues. So I think
his children are well protected, and I think he
should be allowed immediate unsupervised
contact with his children. That would be my
recommendation. I would not make that if I
was not, you know, of that opinion. In other
cases, I’m very conservative in terms of
placing somebody back with their family. I
mean, there’s no evidence that he’s ever even
abused his children.
THE COURT:

I take it your conclusion would be a nonincarceratory sentence with substantial close
supervision and treatment?

THE WITNESS:

Yes.

Hr’g Tr., Apr. 1, 2015, at 94:17-95:22 (emphasis added).
The expert noted that separating R.V. from his family would harm his children:
It is my opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that he
could live with his family without placing his children at risk.
Indeed, given the negative effects of his separation from his
children, it is my opinion that it would be in his children’s best
interest to be reunited with him.
Krueger Letter at 12 (emphasis added); see also Hr’g Tr., Apr. 1, 2015, at 54:23-55:3.
Dr. Krueger also opined about R.V’s response to Mustard Seed’s treatment:
[COUNSEL]:

And what were your impressions of [Dr.
Ford’s treatment] recommendation?

[THE WITNESS]:

That [R.V.] had been with the program. He
had been there. He was motivated. He was
motivated, that he was cooperating. They
gave him a good prognosis, and it seems to
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me an appropriate program that will well take
care of [R.V.].
[COUNSEL]:

Ok.

[THE WITNESS]:

I would also like to add that it could certainly
aid in the sort of management of his overall
risk. They have the capability of doing
random drug screens.
They have the
capability of bringing in family members,
working with wives which could be
beneficial.

[COUNSEL]:

Is there any other therapy that you might
recommend for [R.V.] that you might find
helpful?

[THE WITNESS]:

No. I think that – I think that if you were
allowed to be in the community under
conditions of federal probation, federal
supervision would be helpful. And I think
that his participation in Mustard Seed would
be a very appropriate program, good
program.

Hr’g Tr., Apr. 1, 2015, at 62:22-63:15.
B. Social Worker
Vivianne Guevara, Director of Client and Mitigation Services at the Federal Defenders of
New York and a licensed social worker, conducted an assessment of R.V.’s family. Ms. Guevara
submitted a written evaluation and testified on the state of R.V.’s family and R.V.’s contribution
to his family. See R.V. Sent. Mem., Mar. 30, 2015, ECF No. 41 (sealed), at Ex. C (“Family
Assessment”); Hr’g Tr., Apr. 1, 2015, at 5:20-37:4. In order to conduct her assessment, Ms.
Guevara met with R.V. alone once and with R.V. and his family four times. Id. at 8:2-3. The last
three meetings with R.V.’s family took place in R.V.’s home and lasted between one hour to one
hour and a half each. Id. at 8:10-13.
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Ms. Guevara testified that she observed “a very close-knit family who was very supportive
of each other, the children even supportive of their own parents . . . and parents that are very
supportive of their children most of all, very interested in their children’s success.” Id. at 13:1725. She noted that, while R.V.’s arrest in this case “could have potentially fragmented this family”
it instead “created a new sense of value, and a bond created by a shared experience, from which
they all hope to move forward.” Family Assessment at 6.
Ms. Guevara spoke to the extent of R.V.’s critical contribution to his family unit:
[R.V.] even before this case was responsible for all of the financial
income for the family. He brought in and brings in the only income
for the family. . . .
In addition to the financial responsibility, he does make most of the
meals in the home. That is a huge responsibility. And also important,
he is a good co-parent in the family. [R.V.’s wife] has held the
family together when he wasn’t in [the] home, but it was a huge
burden, and together, they parent these children. Without him there,
it would be a huge burden financially and parenting-wise on the
entire family.
Hr’g Tr., Apr. 1, 2015, at 14:16-18; 15:1-7 (emphasis added).
The social worker concluded that R.V.’s absence would have a negative impact on his
family. Id. at 19:19-21 (“The children love their father they look to him for support and guidance
and without him, they would be missing an important part of their lives[.]”). According to Ms.
Guevara, R.V.’s continued presence in his home would benefit both his family as well as R.V.’s
own treatment:
[R.V.’s] presence and participation in the home is vital to this
family’s healing and progress, as well as [R.V.’s] own productivity
and compliance. [R.V.’s] family is a protective factor that will
motivate him to seek outlets and activities that will be in compliance
with his restrictions and benefit his and his family’s overall health
and healing.
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Family Assessment at 6.
C. Family
On April 24, 2015 the court ordered that R.V.’s wife and children be present in person at
R.V.’s sentencing hearing. Scheduling Order, Apr. 24, 2015, ECF No. 45.
The court observed and questioned defendant’s children. There was a clear indication of
a loving relationship among parents and children.
IV. Sentence Imposed
Defendant was sentenced on April 30, 2015. See Sent. Hr’g. Before sentencing, R.V.
affirmed his guilty plea. Id. at 24:21-26:11.
The total Guidelines offense level is 28. The criminal history category is I, yielding a
Guidelines imprisonment range of 78-97 months. U.S.S.G. Ch. 5 Pt. A; see also Sent. Hr’g, at
28:8-9.
Defendant was sentenced to time-served and seven years supervised release, with the
requirement of intense continuing treatment. See Sent. Hr’g, at 37:17-24. The sentence represents
a downward departure from the Guidelines. Defendant was ordered to pay $2,000 in restitution, a
$12,500 fine and $100 special assessment. See id. at 24:9-11, 28:15-20.
The sentencing proceedings were videotaped to develop an accurate record of the
courtroom atmosphere, as well as some of the subtle factors and considerations that a district court
must consider in imposing a sentence. See In re Sentencing, 219 F.R.D. 262, 264-65 (E.D.N.Y.
2004) (describing the value of video recording for possible review of sentences on appeal).
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V. Sentencing Context
A. Shifting Societal Norms
Views on what delineates the bounds of acceptable pornography have varied, as anyone is
aware who visits the excavations of Herculaneum—long-buried by ashes from Mount Vesuvius—
where ancient public pornography is preserved. The works of great Renaissance and early
Impressionist artists immortalized the images of children as sexual objects. See Mass. v. Oakes,
491 U.S. 576, 593 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Many of the world’s greatest artists—Degas,
Renoir, Donatello, to name but a few—have worked from models under 18 years of age . . . .”).
One need not look so far back to encounter different social mores. “[I]t was not until the
1880s that the age of consent in America was raised from ten years of age. Indeed the concept of
an ‘in-between’ period existing between childhood and adulthood, known as adolescence, did not
develop until the early twentieth century.” Michael J. Henzey, Going on the Offensive: A
Comprehensive Overview of Internet Child Pornography Distribution and Aggressive Legal
Action, 11 Appalachian J.L. 1, 3 (2011) (footnotes omitted). “[E]rotic accounts of adult-child sex
were commonplace in nineteenth century literature; Victorian era photographs and prints of young
teenagers and pre-pubescent children also existed.” Id. (footnote omitted).
The advent of photography spurred the “production, collection and exchange of
pornographic material depicting children” in the mid-nineteenth century. Jessica A. Ramirez,
Propriety of Internet Restrictions for Sex Offenders Convicted of Possession of Child
Pornography: Should We Protect Their Virtual Liberty at the Expense of the Safety of Our
Children?, 12 Ave Maria L. Rev. 123, 125 (2014). By the 1960s, the accessibility of child
pornography had increased. Id. (footnote omitted). At this time,
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President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Commission on Pornography and
Obscenity determined that the nation would be best served by
repealing all laws that restrict the distribution of obscene materials.
In the U.S., materials clearly advertised as child pornography
became widely available for purchase in stores.
Henzey, supra, at 4-5 (footnotes omitted); see also Emily Weissler, Head Versus Heart: Applying
Empirical Evidence About the Connection Between Child Pornography and Child Molestation to
Probable Cause Analyses, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 1487, 1492 (2013) (“[I]n the 1960s, there was a
general relaxation of censorship standards, and pornographic pictures and films of children became
more widely available.”) (footnote omitted). But the late 1970s saw a shift in mindsets:
[In the 1970s, feminist groups and others] began pushing back on
the liberal sexual attitudes of the 1960s and 70s. . . . Congress and
state legislatures passed statutes specifically targeting child
pornography as a crime, distinct from obscenity, by the late 1970s.
The open trade era of child pornography and relaxed attitudes
towards adult-child sex had come to an end.
Id.
Photographic child pornography came in “formats like magazines, 16-millimeter movie
film, Polaroid pictures . . . .” Gray Mateo, The New Face of Child Pornography: Digital Imaging
Technology and the Law, 2008 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 175, 178 (internal quotation marks and
footnote omitted); see also Ramirez, supra, at 125 (“through most of the twentieth century . . .
these images were usually produced at the local level, were costly and of poor quality, and were
difficult to acquire”) (footnote omitted); Eric Griffin-Shelley, Sex and Love Addicts, Who Sexually
Offend: Two Cases of Online Use of Child Pornography, 21 Sexual Addiction & Compulsivity:
The J. of Treatment & Prevention 322, 323 (2014) (“Mail or adult bookstores were the vehicles
for finding child pornography prior to the 21st century.”). Prior to the advent of the Internet,
“production and duplication of [child pornography] required expensive equipment of the kind not
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normally found in the average home. To distribute images of child abuse, one had to either
personally transport them or rely on a domestic mail carrier. Unsurprisingly, these challenges and
risks may have served as barriers to offending for some persons who would have otherwise been
inclined to obtain [child pornography].” Erik Faust, et al., Child Pornography Possessors and
Child Contact Sex Offenders: A Multilevel Comparison of Demographic Characteristics and Rates
of Recidivism, Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment (Feb. 19, 2014),
http://sax.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/02/19/1079063214521469, at 2.
Efforts in the 1980s “to suppress the American child-porn trade—a small network of adult
bookstores and mail-order services—were so successful that within a decade the market was all
but nonexistent.” Rachel Aviv, The Science of Sex Abuse: Is it Right to Imprison People for
Heinous Crimes They Have Not Yet Committed?, The New Yorker, Jan. 14, 2013; Henzey, supra,
at 4-5 (“By 1986, most of the traditional methods of distributing child pornography were shut
down.”).
The Internet revolution “undid those [control] achievements.” Id.
B. Changing Technological Landscape
1. Personal Computer Revolution
The “personal computer revolution” was launched in 1976, with the introduction of the
“Apple I” computer and in 1977, with the introduction of the “Apple II.” M. Scott Boone, The
Past, Present, and Future of Computing and Its Impact on Digital Rights Management, 2008 Mich.
St. L. Rev. 413, 416 (2008) (footnote omitted). Still, at first the number of personal computers
was quite small; only around two hundred Apple I computers were produced. Id. (footnote
omitted). “The late 1970s and early 1980s saw the first spread of computers from isolated
government and industrial usage to everyday personal usage.” Audrey Rogers, From Peer-to-Peer
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Networks to Cloud Computing: How Technology Is Redefining Child Pornography Laws, 87 St.
John’s L. Rev. 1013, 1028 (2013) (footnote omitted). By 1993, Apple “produced over six million
personal computers within the Apple II model series.” Boone, supra, at 416 (footnote omitted).
By 2014, eight in ten adults in the United States would report that “they use laptop and
desktop computers somewhere in their lives—at home, work, school, or someplace else.”
Susannah Fox & Lee Rainie, The Web at 25 in the U.S., Part 1: How the Internet has Woven
Itself into American Life, Pew Research Center (Feb. 27, 2014),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/02/27/part-1-how-the-internet-has-woven-itself-into-americanlife/. The following graphic represents this rapid increase:

Id.
2. Internet Revolution
[In] [t]he late 1970s and early 1980s . . . connectivity between
computers was evolving. In the 1970s, computer engineers at
research institutions throughout the United States began to link their
computers together using telecommunications technology. The first
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networking card was created in 1973, allowing data transfer between
connected computers. In time, the network, originally limited to
academic and military institutions, spread and became known as the
Internet.
Rogers, supra, at 1028 (footnotes omitted). Linking of computers allowed for the increasing
popularity of online discussions and file-sharing. Id. As Audrey Rogers recounts:
In the 1990s, the tandem spread of applications like e-mail and the
World Wide Web and the development of fast networking
technologies like Ethernet saw computer networking become
commonplace. . . .
While file-sharing was initially done through Usenet and Bulletin
Boards, in 1999, Napster was released. Napster was a centralized
system that indexed and stored music files that users of Napster
made available on their computers for others to download. Files
were transferred directly between users after authorization by
Napster. It became extremely popular, and in 2001, Napster was
sued by several recording companies. Napster lost in court against
these companies and was eventually shut down.
The next technological milestone was the development of
decentralized file-sharing systems. The decentralized systems allow
users to directly connect to each other’s files, rather than going
through a central index site. In 2001, Kazaa was released, with users
mainly exchanging music files and other file types, such as videos,
applications, and documents, over the Internet. Until its decline in
2004, Kazaa was the most popular file-sharing program in the world.
As with Napster, it faced, and lost, numerous copyright infringement
suits, until it declined in use and popularity.
New iterations of file-sharing networks, such as Limewire and
BitTorrent, continue to allow no-cost, decentralized, peer-to-peer
file-sharing. Furthermore, file-sharing software evolved, so that
computer users no longer had to install and configure sophisticated
multiple file-sharing programs.
Id. at 1028-31 (footnotes omitted).
In 1995, just 14% of adults in the United States had Internet access. Fox & Rainie, supra
(footnote omitted). In fact, only 42% of adults had even heard of the Internet, and “an additional
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21% were vague on the concept—they knew it had something to do with computers and that was
about it.” Id. Less than two decades later, in January 2014, 87% of adults in the United States
used the internet:

Pew Research Center, Internet User Demographics (Jan. 2014) (showing the large percentage of
the adult population in the United States using the internet in 2014), http://www.
pewinternet.org/data-trend/internet-use/latest-stats; see also Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d
359, 377 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (same). At this point, there was “near-saturation usage among those
living in households earning $75,000 or more (99%), young adults ages 18-29 (97%), and those
with college degrees (97%).” Susannah Fox & Lee Rainie, The Web at 25 in the U.S., Summary
of Findings, Pew Research Center (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/02/27/theweb-at-25-in-the-u-s/.
The “rise of the internet changed the way that people got information and shared it with
each other, affecting everything from users’ basic social relationships to the way that they work,
learn, and take care of themselves.” Three Technology Revolutions, Pew Research Center,
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http://www.pewinternet.org/three-technology-revolutions/; see also Amanda Lenhart, Teens,
Social Media & Technology Overview 2015, Pew Research Center (Apr. 9, 2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/teens-social-media-technology-2015/.

Today,

“the

Internet has become the most fundamental global communications and knowledge infrastructure
of our age, and is fast becoming the basic data-and-control network of the coming decade.” Yochai
Benkler & David D. Clark, Introduction, 2016 Daedalus J. of the Am. Acad. of Arts & Scis. 5.
a. Broadband Revolution
“The speed of internet connectivity picked up considerably with the rise of broadband
connections. As people adopted . . . higher-speed, always-on connections, they became different
internet users: They spent more time online, performed more activities, watched more video, and
themselves bec[a]me content creators.” Three Technology Revolutions, Pew Research Center,
supra; see also Dr. Raul Katz, The Impact of Broadband on the Economy: Research to Date and
Policy

Issues,

ITU,

(April

2012),

https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/broadband/ITU-BB-

Reports_Impact-of-Broadband-on-the-Economy.pdf, at 1 (“The diffusion of broadband, defined
as the technology that enables high-speed transfer of data, is inextricably linked to the emergence
of the Internet. While at its initial stages the Internet was primarily accessed through dial-up
means, consumer and enterprise demand prompted the development of technologies that facilitated
access at higher speeds.”) (footnote omitted). The following graphic illustrates this revolution:
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Three Technology Revolutions, Pew Research Center, supra.
b. Rise of Mobile Connectivity
By the spring of 2015, “64% of American adults . . . own[ed] a smartphone of some kind,
up from 35% in the spring of 2011.” Aaron Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, Pew Research
Center (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015/. As a
result of “mobile connectivity through cell phones, and later smartphones and tablet computers . .
. any time-anywhere access to information [is now] a reality for the vast majority of Americans,”
as shown below:
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Three Technology Revolutions, Pew Research Center, supra.
Mobile connectivity has, in turn, “changed the way people think about how and when they
can communicate and gather information by making just-in-time and real-time encounters
possible. [It has] also affected the way people allocate their time and attention.” Id.; see also
Andrew K. Przybylski & Netta Weinstein, Can You Connect with Me Now? How the Presence of
Mobile Communication Technology Influences Face-to-Face Conversation Quality, 30 J. Soc.
Pers. Relationships 237, 237-46 (2012) (“Interviews reveal mobile phones provide a continual
sense of connection to the wider social world—a feeling that persists even if a mobile is in ‘silent
mode.’”) (citation omitted).
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c. Rise of Social Media
By 2011, the social networking site “Facebook host[ed] 140 billion photos.” See Jay
Yarow, Chart of the Day: Facebook’s Huge Trove of Photos in Context, Business Insider (Sept.
19, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-of-the-day-the-largest-photo-libraries-in-theworld-2011-9/. As a result, “[p]eople now see more images in a day than our ancestors would
have seen in their lives; over 3.5 trillion photos have been taken, and there are ubiquitous tools for
sharing such photos.” Elizabeth G. Porter, Taking Images Seriously, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1687,
1699 (2014).
Today, social media and social networking affect “the way that people think about their
friends, acquaintances, and even strangers.” Three Technology Revolutions, Pew Research Center,
supra.

In the past, people had mostly physical social networks comprised of family and friends.

That has changed radically.
The new reality is that as people create social networks in
technology spaces, those networks are often bigger and more diverse
than in the past. . . . One of the major impacts was that the traditional
boundaries between private and public, between home and work,
between being a consumer of information and producer of it were
blurred.
Id.
d. Emergence of the Cloud
Cloud computing represents the “newest technology:”
[F]iles are stored in a shared pool of computer resources on the
Internet, accessible from any computer. Users do not download and
install applications on their own device or computer; all processing
and storage is maintained by the cloud server. The latest
commercial uses promote file storage and access. For example, a
person may store files from his computer onto a cloud service
provider, such as Dropbox. The cloud system allows him to access
his files from any computer by logging onto his cloud server. A
cloud user may permit shared access to his files by designating
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users. Thus, similar to peer-to-peer networks, once a person allows
access to his files, others may see them at any time. Unlike peer-topeer networks, private cloud services require that a person designate
who may have shared access.
The cloud is just the latest battleground between law enforcement
and child pornographers. The ability of child pornographers to use
cloud computing for their wares has already been recognized. While
some cloud providers are employing filtering techniques to suppress
access to illegal images, there is a growing concern the cloud will
provide deeper cover for pornographers. At the same time, cloud
technology is beginning to raise possession and distribution
questions.
Rogers, supra, at 1032-33 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
C. How Internet Revolution Enabled Child Pornography Consumption
The Internet revolution had a dramatic impact on the availability of pornography generally.
“In 1991, the year the World Wide Web went online, there were fewer than ninety different adult
magazines published in America.” Ogi Ogas & Sai Gaddam, A Billion Wicked Thoughts: What
the Internet Tells Us About Sexual Relationships 8 (2012) (comprehensive study by neuroscientist
of online pornography use). According to what the authors dubbed the “most comprehensive
collection of porn-use stats on the web,” in 2010, about 4 percent of the most trafficked websites
in the world were sex-related. Julie Ruvolo, How Much of the Internet is Actually for Porn, Forbes,
Sept. 7, 2011 (interviewing neuroscientist Ogi Ogas). “From July 2009 to July 2010, about 13%
of Web searches were for erotic content.” Id. To put the numbers in perspective, “Xvideos, the
largest porn site on the web with 4.4 billion page views per month, is three times the size of CNN
or ESPN, and twice the size of Reddit. LiveJasmin isn’t much smaller. YouPorn, Tube8, and
Pornhub—they’re all vast, vast sites that dwarf almost everything except the Googles and
Facebooks of the internet.” Sebastian Anthony, Just How Big Are Porn Sites?, ExtremeTech.com
(Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.extremetech.com/computing/123929-just-how-big-are-porn-sites.
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“Approximately three quarters of men and half of women have intentionally viewed pornography
over the internet.” Kelly M. Babchishin, et al., Online Child Pornography Offenders are Different:
A Meta-Analysis of the Characteristics of Online and Offline Sex Offenders Against Children, 44
Arch. of Sexual Behav. 45, 45 (2015) (citation omitted).
The effect of the Internet revolution has been to largely remove physical barriers to child
pornography. See Faust, et al., supra, at 2-3. The Internet has been described as offering a “triple
A engine of anonymity, availability, and affordability.” Weissler, supra, at 1496 (internal
quotation marks and footnote omitted). Digital media, in various forms,
offer[s] quick and easy ways of producing and duplicating sexually
explicit images or videos of minors. Furthermore, the Internet
allows for the rapid exchange of these images between users from
all parts of the globe. As the ability to store large amounts of data
at low cost increases, users are easily able to retain voluminous
quantities of images and video. The true quantity of child abuse
images stored around the world is incalculable, and the ability of
interested individuals to access this data is limited only by the extent
of their technical knowledge and their willingness to risk detection.
With most homes and businesses offering ready access to a
computer and the Internet along with the relative anonymity
associated with the massive volume of online transactions, the
perceived risk of involvement with child abuse images has
diminished considerably.
Faust, et al., supra, at 2-3 (emphasis added).
As noted by the United States Sentencing Commission,
[t]hese technological changes have resulted in exponential increases
in the volume and ready accessibility of child pornography,
including many graphic sexual images involving very young
victims, a genre that previously was not as widely circulated as it is
today. As a result of such changes, entry-level offenders now easily
can acquire and distribute large quantities of child pornography at
little or no financial cost and often in an anonymous, indiscriminate
manner.

40

U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Federal Child Pornography Offenses (Dec. 2012), at 312-13 (footnote
omitted); see also Richard Wortley & Stephen Smallbone, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Off. of
Community Oriented Policing Servs., Child Pornography on the Internet, Problem-Oriented
Guides

for

Police

Problem-Specific

Guides

Series

No.

41

(May

2006),

http://www.popcenter.org/problems/pdfs/ChildPorn.pdf, at 8 (“The Internet has escalated the
problem of child pornography by increasing the amount of material available, the efficiency of its
distribution, and the ease of its accessibility.”); Kathryn C. Seigfried-Spellar, et al., Internet Child
Pornography, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and the Role of Internet Service Providers, 88 Inst. for
Computer Scis., Soc. Informatics & Telecomm. Eng’r 17, 25 (2012) (“Researchers agree the
amount of child pornography available via the Internet is unknown, and its complete removal
remains impossible.”) (citation omitted; emphasis added).
Today, “[c]hild pornography images are readily available through virtually every Internet
technology including websites, email, instant messaging/ICQ, Internet Relay Chat (IRC),
newsgroups, bulletin boards, peer-to-peer networks, and social networking sites.”
Justice,

Child

Exploitation

and

Obscenity

Section,

Child

Dep’t of

Pornography,

http://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/child-pornography (emphasis added); see also Krueger, et
al., Sexual and Other Axis I Diagnoses of 60 Males Arrested for Crimes Against Children Involving
the Internet, supra, at 625 (“[C]hild pornography is much easier to acquire over the Internet, with
only a few clicks of a mouse, compared with printed pornography or DVDs, which would require
much more time and effort to obtain . . . . [T]he intensity of deviant sexual interest is likely to be
greater in those who need to expend more effort to acquire pornography from sources other than
the Internet.”). The following charts lay out many ways that child pornography is accessed, shared
and downloaded on the Internet:
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Wortley & Smallbone, supra, at 10-11.
With the decrease in popularity of fee-based websites, the use of peer-to-peer networks to
share and exchange child pornography has steadily increased. See Jelani Jefferson Exum, Making
the Punishment Fit the (Computer) Crime: Rebooting Notions of Possession for the Federal
Sentencing of Child Pornography Offenses, 16 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 8 (2010), http://
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jolt.richmond.edu/v16i3/article8.pdf, at 5; Ryan Hurley, et al., Measurement and Analysis of Child
Pornography

Trafficking

on

P2P

Networks

(May

2013)

http://forensics.umass.edu/pubs/hurley.www.2013.pdf, at 1 (footnote omitted) (noting that peerto-peer networks have become the “most popular mechanism for the criminal acquisition and
distribution of child sexual exploitation imagery, commonly known as child pornography.”); cf.
Maggie Muething, Inactive Distribution: How the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Distribution
of Child Pornography Fail to Effectively Account for Peer-to-Peer Networks, 73 Ohio St. L.J. 1485
(2012).
“Peer-to-peer networks, a relatively recent technological development[,] . . . allow[] users
to download files from the computers of other users. Unlike other means of acquiring files over
the Internet, such as in a chat room or using e-mail . . . no personalized contact is required between
the provider and receiver.” Id. at 1487-88 (footnotes omitted).

Popular networks include

“LimeWire, BitTorrent, Gnutella, eDonkey, Grokster, Kazaa and sundry others, [which] operate
by directly connecting network participants to one another without the use of a centralized server.”
United States v. Handy, No. 6:08-CR-180, 2009 WL 151103, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2009).
Joining a network does not require installation of “sophisticated multiple file-sharing programs.”
Rogers, supra, at 1031 (footnote omitted). A user “need only download the compatible software
from the Internet to become part of the network and be able to download digital files from other
members of that network” or upload or post files to the network. Id. (footnotes omitted). The
content of the shared files is not monitored by the peer-to-peer network.

Muething, supra, at

1489.
“A crucial aspect of peer-to-peer file-sharing is that the default setting for these networks
is that downloaded files are placed in the user’s ‘shared’ folder, which allows others in the network
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to access the files. A user must affirmatively change his network setting to disable this sharing
feature. The network is designed to encourage sharing by providing faster downloading if the user
allows sharing.” Rogers, supra, at 1031 (footnotes omitted); see also Muething, supra, at 1489
(“To encourage uploading, peer-to-peer programs often provide incentives, such as faster
downloading capabilities, to users who share files.”) (footnote omitted); cf. Handy, 2009 WL
151103 at *1 (noting the different ways in which peer-to-peer programs operate and that “the
specific type of [peer-to-peer] application installed on a defendant’s computer, and what settings
are in place within that [peer-to-peer] application, are critical to the determination of whether a
defendant’s Guideline sentence should be enhanced pursuant to § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F).”). Although
child pornography files are generally “only available for a short amount of time (only about 30%
are available for more than 10 days of the year), there are at least tens of thousands of unique [child
pornography] files available on [peer-to-peer] networks for download each day.” Hurley, et al.,
supra, at 1.
According to the Sentencing Commission, most of the offenders who are found to
“distribute” child pornography are “solely engaged in ‘impersonal’ anonymous distribution by
using an ‘open’ [peer-to-peer] program such as LimeWire, with no two-way communication
between the offender who distributed and persons who obtained images or videos from the
offender’s computer.” U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Federal Child Pornography Offenses, at 150-51
(footnote omitted) (discussing data from the Sentencing Commission’s special coding project of
non-production cases from fiscal year 2010). The rate of offenders who use peer-to-peer filesharing to access child pornography has continued to increase in recent years. Id. at 166; see also
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The National Strategy for Child Exploitation Prevention and Interdiction:
A Report to Congress (Aug. 2010), at 14.
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According to one scholar, the ease of the technology has meant that “[i]ndividuals who
might not have become [child pornography] traffickers may do so after encountering the material
in [peer-to-peer] networks. Easy access to [child pornography] in [peer-to-peer] networks also
may foster the proliferation of [child pornography]. Every time a [child pornography] file is
downloaded, a new copy of the image is created.” Janis Wolak, et al., Measuring a Year of Child
Pornography Trafficking by U.S. Computers on a Peer-to-Peer Network, 38 Child Abuse &
Neglect 347, 348-49 (2014).
Some online users may happen upon child pornography by chance. For example, in one
study, some participants exhibited a “curiosity without a fixated interest.” Krueger, et al., Sexual
and Other Axis I Diagnoses of 60 Males Arrested for Crimes Against Children Involving the
Internet, supra, at 630. “[M]any individuals would tend to search for all sorts of atypical
pornographic images and ‘drift’ from one site to another, selecting child pornography as one of
many new types of images or activities to explore.” Id. One scholar summarized the different
theories for why people start to view child pornography, stating that for some men use starts with
no mens rea:
[The] onset (the first deliberate viewing of child pornography)
[may] occur[] impulsively and/or out of curiosity. The fact that child
pornography may be viewed so easily – literally with “one click” of
a mouse – lends credibility to such claims. It may be that the
decision to view child pornography is simpler in a sexually aroused
state; evidence indicates that sexual arousal is associated with
increased risk taking behaviours and lower perceptions of negative
consequences. Still, other findings suggest that onset may occur in
the absence of sexual arousal. [Two scholars] generated a fictitious
website which advertised free and legal games. Visitors (N = 803)
to the site found, among other things, links to explicit, or “hardcore,”
adult pornography. Despite visiting the site with an interest in
gaming or other apparently non-sexual reasons, 457 visitors
attempted to access the hardcore pornography. Admittedly, no fake
links to child pornography were included in this study. Nonetheless
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it supports the notion that onset into child pornography might occur
without prior planning or sexual arousal.
Jeremy Prichard, et al., Internet Subcultures and Pathways to the Use of Child Pornography, 27
Comp. Law & Security Review 585, 587 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted;
emphasis added).
The accessibility of online child pornography may also “disinhibit and desensitize people,
especially to the sexualization of children. Such easy access can spark curiosity and lead to sexual
exploration that might otherwise have remained dormant or unstimulated.” Griffin-Shelley, supra,
at 323 (citation omitted); see also Hannah Lena Merdian et al., The Three Dimensions of Online
Child Pornography Offending, 19 J. of Sexual Aggression 121, 124 (2013) (“perceived anonymity
and de-individuation of the internet may trigger behaviours which reflect inner personal desires
that are usually suppressed by social constraints”) (citation omitted); Hr’g Tr., Apr. 1, 2015, at
84:14-15 (Krueger) (“People think they are looking at it and no one is looking at them.”). Chat
rooms where child pornography is exchanged and discussed, may “normalize and validate sexual
exploitation of children, promote the ‘market’ for child pornography, and may directly or indirectly
encourage others to produce new images of child pornography.” U.S. Sentencing Comm’n,
Federal Child Pornography Offenses, at 313 (footnote omitted).
A recent finding lends support to this mistaken sense of privacy, and also to the deterrent
value of some forms of monitoring:
In November 2013, both Google and Microsoft announced that they
were removing child pornographic content from their indices,
filtering search results, and returning warnings when specific
searches were used. Users searching for [child pornography] on
Google in the United States are provided a Google Ad warning:
Protecting children from sexual abuse
Child sexual abuse imagery is illegal.
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At Google we work with child protection experts to find, remove
and report this material because we never want it to appear anywhere
on our products, including our search results.
To report child sexual abuse content or to find help for a child in the
US, please contact the National Center for Missing & Exploited
Children.
Similarly, Bing returns an ad with the following warning:
Child porn, exploitative, or abusive content is illegal.
Get help now. . . .
The data show a precipitous drop in child pornography searches
starting in July 2013, commensurate with the announcements noted
above.
Chad M.S. Steel, Web-based Child Pornography: The Global Impact of Deterrence Efforts and its
Consumption on Mobile Platforms, 44 Child Abuse & Neglect 150, 154 (2015) (citations omitted;
emphasis added).
D. Connection between Child Pornography Consumers and Child Molesters
“[A] typical profile of child pornography offenders is missing.” Jenny A.B.M. Houtepen,
et al., From Child Pornography Offending to Child Sexual Abuse: A Review of Child Pornography
Offender Characteristics and Risks for Cross-Over, 19 Aggression & Violent Behavior 466, 467
(2014); see also U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Federal Child Pornography Offenses, at 76 (noting
that “[r]esearchers have attempted to classify child pornography offenders into different types
based on their behavior and use of child pornography,” but that “while categories can be helpful,
the spectrum of child pornography offenders is not static . . . .”). It should not be ignored that
child pornography offenders may include several distinct subgroups of child pornography users of
varying dangerousness to children:
Recreational users access child pornography on impulse or out of
curiosity based on a penchant for pornography and a desire to look
at a wide range of pornographic material. Sexual compulsive users
view child pornography because of the extremeness of its content
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rather than a particular preference for children. Preferential
offenders mostly consist of pedophiles with a definite preference for
children. Miscellaneous offenders consist of media reporters and
concerned citizens who have crossed the line from investigation into
offending, as well as pranksters and older teenagers attempting to
sexually interact with younger teenagers. Profiteers do not
necessarily enjoy looking at child pornography but rather use it for
financial gain.
Jason Scheff, Disproving the “Just Pictures” Defense: Interrogative Use of the Polygraph to
Investigate Contact Sexual Offenses Committed by Child Pornography Suspects, 68 N.Y.U. Ann.
Surv. Am. L. 603, 635-36 (2013) (footnotes omitted); see also Seigfried-Spellar, supra, at 28
(“[T]he motivations and reasons are just as diverse as the user, and child pornography consumers
cannot be ‘lumped’ into one homogenous category of offenders.”); Weissler, supra, at 1503
(“commentators agree that child pornography collectors are motivated by a wide number of factors
and should not be viewed as a homogeneous class.”) (emphasis added).
Often, child pornography offenders are “well educated and ‘well integrated in . . . society.’”
Scheff, supra, at 609 (internal citations omitted); see also Krueger, et al., Sexual and Other Axis I
Diagnoses of 60 Males Arrested for Crimes Against Children Involving the Internet, supra, at 625
(“[C]hild pornography offenders [a]re apt to be more intelligent, better educated, and more likely
to be referred by their lawyers than others . . . .”). The Internet revolution has drastically impacted
the number and variety of people arrested for child pornography offenses:
[T]he population of individuals being arrested for Internet crimes
against children may be substantially different from the population
of individuals arrested for crimes against children in the era before
the Internet. Some features of the Internet, such as anonymity or the
use of a computer, may allow for individuals, who would otherwise
be inhibited or embarrassed if they had to directly purchase such
material or interact with minors, to engage in such illegal behaviors
over the Internet.
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Krueger, et al., Sexual and Other Axis I Diagnoses of 60 Males Arrested for Crimes Against
Children Involving the Internet, supra, at 630; see also supra Part V.C.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sometimes seems to have assumed that “child
pornography shares a strong nexus with pedophilia” and that pedophiles use child pornography as
“a model for sexual acting out with children.” U.S. v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 198 (2d Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation mark and citation omitted). Automatically equating non-production child
pornography offenders—people who possess, acquire or distribute images of child sexual
exploitation—with pedophiles or child molesters is misleading. Some “research has suggested
that the motivation to collect child pornography exists along a continuum, ranging from individuals
who are solely collectors, to those who collect and actively seek validation for their interests, to
those who swap/trade/sell child pornography, to those who produce child pornography, to those
who both collect child pornography and abduct children.” Weissler, supra, at 1502 (footnote
omitted).
Pedophilia has been defined as “a clinical psychiatric diagnosis of a persistent sexual
interest in sexually immature children and can be manifested in thoughts, fantasies, urges, sexual
arousal, or behavior.” U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Federal Child Pornography Offenses, at 73-74.
“While a pedophile might sexually prefer children and fantasize about acting on these desires,
without such action, he is not a child molester.” Scheff, supra, at 637 (“To be sure, many child
molesters are pedophiles and many pedophiles are child molesters, but failing to appreciate the
differences between these two groups, and attributing action to nothing more than carnal desires,
is a gross oversimplification.”) (footnotes omitted). According to the Sentencing Commission,
“not all child pornography offenders are pedophiles, and not all child pornography offenders
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engage in other sex offending. While there is overlap in these categories, each is separate and
none is a predicate to any other,” as illustrated by the following chart:

Id. at 73 (the above graph is “merely intended to depict the[] relationships and does not attempt to
show actual ratios of the various groups.”).
Researchers disagree over the extent of overlap between child pornography offenders and
pedophilia, as well as child pornography offenders and contact sexual offenders. See U.S.
Sentencing Comm’n, Federal Child Pornography Offenses, at 75; Weissler, supra, at 1505-17,
1525-26. Available studies indicate that the overlap is likely to be much less than the above graph
suggests. Several reports have found that, generally, child pornography offenders are “at low risk
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to commit hands-on sexual assaults of children.” Austin F. Lee, et al., Predicting Hands-On Child
Sexual Offenses Among Possessors of Internet Child Pornography, 18 Psych., Pol. & Law 644,
668 (2012); see also Merdian, et al., supra, at 123 (summarizing studies and concluding that “[f]or
most offenders, their online offending has no behavioural link to contact sex offending”); Hessick,
supra, at 875 (noting that “the empirical literature is unable to validate the assumption that there
is a causal connection between possession of child pornography and child sex abuse.”). Studies
have shown that:
[W]hile child molesters may possess child pornography, those that
possess child pornography are generally not likely to engage in
contact offenses against children. Instead, child molesters, are
merely a small subset of child pornographers. Or, another way to
look at it is that child molesters and child pornography offenders are
two groups with occasional overlap in membership. . . . Contrary to
what may appear logical, the correlation between pedophilia and
sexual contact offenses against children is not very strong.
Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child Pornography Sentencing: Empirical Validity or Political
Rhetoric?, 22 Stan. L. Pol’y Rev. 545, 580-81 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
Recent research suggests that the recidivism rate of child pornography offenders may be
low, with most child pornography viewers unlikely to engage in future sexual offenses. See
Richard B. Krueger & Meg S. Kaplan, Non-Contact Sexual Offenses: Exhibitionism, Voyeurism,
Possession of Child Pornography, and Interacting with Children Over the Internet, ECF No. 44
(unpublished manuscript), at 51-52 (describing a 2010 study of child pornography offenders by
Seto, Hanson and Babchishin which “revealed that 4.6% of online offenders committed a new
sexual offense during the 1.5 to 6 year follow-up period; 2.0% committed a contact sexual offense,
and 3.4% committed a new child pornography offense. The authors suggested that there could be
a distinct subgroup of online-only offenders who posed a relatively low risk of committing contact
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sexual offenses in the future.”) (emphasis added); see also Sentencing Comm’n, Federal Child
Pornography Offenses, at 310 (the Commission’s recidivism study of 610 non-production
offenders showed that the offenders’ “general recidivism rate . . . was 30.0 percent during an
average follow-up period of eight and one-half years after the offenders’ reentry into the
community” while the offenders’ “known sexual recidivism rate, a subset of the general recidivism
rate, was 3.6 percent.”); but see Letter from Anne Gannon, Nat’l Coordinator for Child
Exploitation Prevention and Interdiction, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Honorable Patti B. Saris, Chair, United States Sentencing Comm’n, (Mar. 5, 2013)
(taking issue with the Commission’s finding that “the recidivism rate of child pornography
offenders is not particularly high compared to other offenders,” because “there is currently no valid
risk assessment instrument applicable to child pornography offenders, and the existing data and
literature do not support the assertion that recidivism rates for child pornography offenders are
overstated.”).
Failing to distinguish between different categories of child pornography offenders may
unintentionally harm children by obfuscating the underlying crucial problem of child sexual abuse:
Concentrating on the presumptive harms of child pornography, both
in the restitution context and in the criminal justice system as a
whole, has ramifications that extend beyond the incorrect
assumption that child pornography viewers are also child sexual
abusers. By focusing on individuals who have a relatively small
chance of committing hands-on child sexual abuse, law enforcement
officials, judges, and legislators neglect the far more common
scenario in which children are sexually abused by people they
already know. Indeed, the sexual abuse portrayed in the vast
majority of child pornography was committed and filmed by the
child’s father, uncle, family member, or close family friend, i.e.,
someone within the child’s circle of trust. . . .
Instead of addressing the complexities of sexual abuse within
families, the existing approaches to child pornography perpetuate
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an illusion of the typical child sex abuser, a “sexual predator” living
completely outside of normal society. . . . Courts also employ the
term sexual predator with regularity, implicitly keeping the focus on
strangers rather than family members.
Cortney E. Lollar, Child Pornography and the Restitution Revolution, 103 J. of Crim. Law &
Criminology 343, 375-76 (2013) (emphasis added) (“Eighty-six percent of child sexual abuse
victims are abused by someone they already know. More than 96% of child pornography victims
already know the person who is filming and producing the images of their sexual abuse.”)
(footnotes omitted); see also Carissa Byrne Hessick, Disentangling Child Pornography from Child
Sex Abuse, 88 Wash. U. L. Rev. 853, 888-90 (2011) (“One of the most pervasive misperceptions
about child sex abuse is that it is a crime perpetrated by strangers.”). The most serious dangers to
children are from persons they know rather than from anonymous pornography viewers. As one
scholar noted:
[T]he unfortunate reality is that child sex abuse is often a messy
intrafamilial problem. And when prosecutors try to bring cases of
child sex abuse against, for example, a child’s relative or a friend of
the family, they will sometimes find that the family members side
with the offender, rather than with the victim. Those who possess
child pornography do not present such problems. They often possess
pictures of children they have never met. And when we engage in
preventative or proxy punishment, we can do so without asking who
took the pictures of the children or which children are at risk.
Because pornography convictions do not require an
acknowledgement of the ugliness associated with non-stranger sex
abuse, society may prefer to punish those who possess child
pornography over those who abuse children.
Punishing
pornography (as opposed to contact offenses) allows us to persist in
our misconception that children are at risk of sex abuse from a
stranger looking at pictures on a computer rather than from the
children’s own circles of family and friends.
Id. at 888-89 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
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By focusing on child pornography offenders, “modern practices have resulted in some
defendants who possess child pornography receiving longer sentences than defendants who
sexually abuse children.” Id. at 860 (footnote omitted; emphasis added); see also U.S. v. Dorvee,
616 F.3d 174, 184 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The irony of the court’s conclusion in this area . . . is that the
Guidelines actually punish some forms of direct sexual contact with minors more leniently than
possession or distribution of child pornography.”).
E. Child Pornography’s Continued Harm to Children
Although non-production child pornography offenders often are not the perpetrators of
direct sexual abuse of minors, actual children have been seriously injured in the production of
those images. By viewing them and contributing to their distribution, child pornography offenders
perpetuate harm. The Department of Justice explained:
The vast majority of children who appear in child pornography have
not been abducted or physically forced to participate. In most cases
they know the producer—it may even be their father—and are
manipulated into taking part by more subtle means. Nevertheless,
to be the subject of child pornography can have devastating
physical, social, and psychological effects on children. The children
portrayed in child pornography are first victimized when their abuse
is perpetrated and recorded. They are further victimized each time
that record is accessed. In one study, 100 victims of child
pornography were interviewed about the effects of their
exploitation—at the time it occurred and in later years. Referring to
when the abuse was taking place, victims described the physical
pain (e.g., around the genitals), accompanying somatic symptoms
(such as headaches, loss of appetite, and sleeplessness), and feelings
of psychological distress (emotional isolation, anxiety, and fear).
However, most also felt a pressure to cooperate with the offender
and not to disclose the offense, both out of loyalty to the offender
and a sense of shame about their own behavior. Only five cases were
ultimately reported to authorities. In later years, the victims reported
that initial feelings of shame and anxiety did not fade but intensified
to feelings of deep despair, worthlessness, and hopelessness. Their
experience had provided them with a distorted model of sexuality,
55

and many had particular difficulties in establishing and maintaining
healthy emotional and sexual relationships.
Wortley & Smallbone, supra, at 17-18 (footnotes omitted). “[C]hild pornography creates a
permanent record of the abuse, which may trouble victims for the rest of their lives.” Henzey,
supra, at 8; see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982) (“[The] materials produced are
a permanent record of the children’s participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their
circulation.”) (footnote omitted); U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Federal Child Pornography Offenses,
at 311 (“Child pornography offenses inherently involve the sexual abuse and exploitation of
children. Victims are harmed initially during the production of child pornography, but the
perpetual nature of the distribution of images on the Internet causes a significant, separate, and
continuing harm to victims.”).
F. Effects of Excessive Punishment on Defendants and Families
The court has received many letters from defendants, their families, and concerned persons
regarding the effects and appropriateness of punishment, including lengthy prison sentences and
strict sex offender registration requirements, in what are essentially non-production child
pornography cases. A sampling of excerpts from those letters follows:
A woman wrote:
[T]here is no evidence that these individuals can be rehabilitated,
and who would fund treatment programs and oversee them? How
do you know whether they pose a threat to society? . . .
More importantly, what about the lives of the millions of innocent
young victims who are forced to pose in child pornography or to
perform unthinkable sex acts? Child pornography is the vilest form
of child abuse on our planet . . . . [M]en who foster and encourage
the sexual exploitation of children by viewing child pornography
should be far more severely penalized! . . .
Would you be comfortable allowing a man who views and
downloads child pornography to babysit your granddaughter or
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grandson? It is impossible to document the danger that these men
pose to society because the viewing and downloading of this
material is done in the privacy of their homes and there are no valid
statistics that correlate the viewing of child pornography with the
perpetration of a sexual assault on a child. That does not mean that
a correlation does not exist. Again, should we not err on the side of
the child? . . .
It would be far more honorable to defend the rights of the innocent
than condone the vile criminal actions of sex offenders, which
include the viewing of child pornography, let alone its downloading
and circulation.
Letter from G. K. G., May 22, 2010, filed in United States v. Polouizzi, No. 6-CR-22, ECF No.
241.
A mother wrote:
Like many young men, our son used the internet to download adult
pornography on Lime Wire along with those images, child
pornography was attached. We clearly do not condone his actions
and agree that a punishment was in order. Our son received 8 years
in a federal prison and will be on a sex offender registry the rest of
his life. He faced 25 years in prison because he downloaded to a
shared file sharing peer to peer [site].
The internet has changed the world and certainly changed the
availability of child pornography. It is unfortunate most of these
images can be viewed without economic exchange, thus debunking
the supply/demand argument. The problem with this issue is similar
to all sex offender issues: the irrational application of a broad brush
without looking for context.
Letter from R.F., Oct. 25, 2013, filed in United States v. Polouizzi, No. 6-CR-22, ECF No. 364-1.
A father wrote:
I have a son who is currently serving an eight year sentence for
viewing and possessing child pornography. He never in any way
encouraged or promoted the actual commission of the acts
themselves nor did he intentionally promote or distribute the videos
to others. A psychologist found that he did not constitute a danger
to others and there was absolutely no evidence to the contrary. He
is not now, nor has he ever been a danger to society. The
offen[s]e(s) occurred when he was in his teens. While I do not
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condone his actions in any way, it was basically a teenager doing
something very stupid. In his case, as well as in many others, the
end result has been to spend millions (if not billions) of dollars
without making our society any safer (and in many case[s] it could
actually have just the opposite effect). . . .
While protection of our society is extremely important, punishments
which (a) do not add anything to protecting society; (b) have
reasonable alternatives which would do so; and (c) are a very
expensive and unnecessary burden on taxpayers are, simply, without
any basis in fact or in reason.
Letter from R. W. F., Oct. 1, 2013, filed in United States v. Polouizzi, No. 6-CR-22, ECF No. 3581.
Another father wrote:
My son took a plea deal and received a 5 year mandatory minimum
sentence for having 2 video[]s and a picture of underage teens. He
was also charged with distribution due to the peer to peer site.
He was working in a think tank in D.C. and had become a policy
expert in Southeast Asia politics. He has a Graduate degree in
International Relations and . . . his life has been destroyed and will
have to register as a sex offender.
He took a polygraph test from a former FBI agent to determine if he
had any inappropriate contact with anyone under or over the legal
age. He passed. He had a psychological exam to determine if he
was a pedophile or a predator[.] [H]e was neither.
[The Federal Judge] challenged the prosecution in the plea deal. She
asked them why a better deal hadn’t been reached. “This is a young
man with no previous history except for this one mistake and this is
the best you could do?” . . .
Our family has been devastated by this incident. It is difficult to talk
to people because they just assume if someone looked at [child
pornography] then they must be a pedophile. Research has shown
that is not the case. People just don’t know what they don’t know.
Letter from B. H., undated, filed in United States v. Polouizzi, No. 6-CR-22, ECF No. 357-1.
A mother wrote:
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I am writing to you on behalf of my son [D.G.] and the sentence he
received. . . . He was sentenced on March 5, 2009 on One count of
Receipt of child pornography. He was committed to the custody of
the Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of TWO
HUNDRED TEN MONTHS which is 17 ½ years for Receiving. . .
. He never hurt or touched anyone and yet he got sentenced worse
than some murderers or rapist[s]. We have not heard of anyone else
with 1 count of receiving get this much time. . . .
My son kept saying he never ask[ed] for what he received . . . .
Someone has to look into this Limewire and stop them from sending
things people don’t ask for because it can get them put in prison. . .
. He has never hurt anyone. He is forty years old. He lived in
Virginia. He was in the United States Air Force during [Desert]
Storm for four years and after he was honorably discharged from
there, he was in the reserves for two years. He worked on the
electronics for air planes before that. . . .
[D.G.] has lost his job, his home, and his life is ruined. [D.G.] is a
good person. He has never been in any trouble with the law. He
worked his way through college. . . .
In jail, he was beaten up three times and left with a scar on his
forehead from seven stitches and he was strangled once by another
inmate. Now in Texarkana prison he was repeatedly kicked because
the inmates found out what his charges were. He says he never
fought back he just told a guard. He can’t fight back with one hand.
He wears a brace on that hand. He is not a violent person but, for
Receiving he has to struggle to survive every day and night. If you
are not a violent offender when you go into prison, you are when
you come out. I truly do not know how he has survived so many
months and has so many more years to go for 1 count of receiving.
He will be on a list for the rest of his life, will have to tell a job what
he was in prison for. How many jobs will hire someone like that??
Letter from S. G., June 30, 2010, filed in United States v. Polouizzi, No. 6-CR-22, ECF No. 2692.
A pastor, apparently not personally impacted by the issue, wrote:
While I still think it is abnormal for any one to view pornography, I
have always felt that the sentences and resources used to entrap these
individuals were excessive. As long as possession does not lead to
any action that can violate a child, I do not see any crime simply in
viewing.
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Letter from Rev. A. M. S., Jan. 17, 2011, filed in United States v. Polouizzi, No. ECF No. 300.
A brother wrote:
My brother-in-law is currently serving a mandatory 5 year sentence
for receipt of child pornography. He pleaded guilty, and forwent
legitimate defenses, to avoid the possibility of an embarrassing trial
and a 10 year sentence.
Only after his arrest did we learn my brother-in-law had an addiction
that began in his teenage years. He was a well-respected real estate
attorney and partner in a prestigious law firm. He lost his license to
practice law, all contact with his ex-wife and daughter and most of
his possessions. He has spent the last 4 years in a low security
facility, working on the painting crew. . . .
My brother-in-law paid a huge price even prior to his incarceration.
. . . I come away from this experience with a profound sense of
waste. My brother-in-law contributed to society as a good parent,
with his skills that helped build commercial development and
through payment of significant tax dollars. Society has not
benefitted or been protected by incarcerating him, isolating him
from his family, failing to utilize his talents and denying itself the
tax revenues he is capable of producing.
I certainly don’t condone child pornography. . . . [T]he abusers of
children are not being punished and are probably not even in this
country. I cannot, however, agree with a law that . . . unnecessarily
destroys lives and places people in prison when treatment and
supervision would allow for rehabilitation. I doubt any member of
Congress who desires to be re-elected will stand on the chamber
floor and argue that we should soften the laws on child pornography,
but we need to have a more sensible approach to this problem.
Letter from J. D. P., June 8, 2010, filed in United States v. Polouizzi, No. 6-CR-22, ECF
No. 254-2.
The letters exemplify the serious adverse collateral consequences that incarceration of a
parent or child can have on the family unit. “Incarceration of a parent normally causes major
negative economic, social and psychological consequences to the child, and may have life-long
[adverse] repercussions.” Michal Gilad, The Young and the Helpless: Re-Defining the Term
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“Child Victim of Crime” (U. Penn. L. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-23, 2014), at 31-32; cf. Jean C.
Lawrence, ASFA in the Age of Mass Incarceration: Go to Prison—Lose Your Child? 40 Wm.
Mitchell L. Rev. 990, 1002-03 (2014) (noting that “the Center for Disease Control has determined
that parental incarceration is an ‘adverse childhood experience’ (ACE) that ‘significantly increases
the likelihood of long-term negative outcomes for children.’”) (footnote omitted); Sarah
Abramowicz, Beyond Family Law, 63 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 293, 321 (2012) (footnotes omitted)
(“[C]hildren separated from their parents suffer developmental harm as well, often in the form of
behavioral and educational difficulties.”); see also United States v. Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d 617,
653-55 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (collecting literature and discussing effect of incarceration on family and
community).
The court received an unsolicited letter from a psychologist, who detailed the effect of
charges of receipt of child pornography on the family of one of her patients:
For many decades I worked as a psychologist with children who had
been separated from their parents and know the heavy price they
pay. Recently I became aware of a father who received three
pictures of child pornography on his computer and was convicted of
this charge. He has been under house arrest for over two years and
will begin a two year prison term in July.
The family consists of mother, father, a biological son of ten and a
six year old boy in the process of being adopted. The older child
will soon be told of his father’s impending incarceration. He will be
devastated. The younger child has neurological deficits for which
he has received excellent attention. He has lived with this family
since infancy and he will be both devastated and confused. His
adoption may be in jeopardy.
Family resources have been decimated because of job loss and legal
fees, the marriage has suffered, and soon the children will be without
a father for two years. Their father has neither inappropriately
touched nor abused children and has been a consistently nurturing
presence in the life of his sons. Their mother works hard to provide
for the financial, medical and emotional needs of the family.
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Letter from J. M. D., May 31, 2010, filed in United States v. Polouizzi, No. 6-CR-22, ECF No.
249-3.
A lady wrote:
I am a loved one of a gentleman that was convicted on a felony-child
pornography charge. . . .
My loved one has had his life torn apart because of his arrest and
conviction. He has lost his marriage, his children, and had his
professional credentials scrutinized with possibility of reprimand or
license removal. He was investigated for 9 months and was found
to have 3 images on his computer, which had come from a site
claiming to have only women of legal age represented. He fought
hard to be handed a class 3 felony and 2 1/2 years of probation, 5
years ago by the state attorney’s office. However, as a resident of
Illinois, he is now required to be a registered sex offender for his
natural lifetime. This registration requirement changed from 10
years to natural lifetime, while his sentencing and case were being
processed.
This man is not a monster; in fact, he is intelligent, professional,
honest, kind, a father, and law abiding. He had no prior issues with
the law and is diligent to not have any since. He was a man who
made a mistake, but will never be able to live it down.
Letter from D. D., July 7, 2010, filed in United States v. Polouizzi, No. 6-CR-22, ECF No. 268-2.
One convicted child pornography offender wrote:
Even though I never created, produced, photographed distributed or
had any part in making any material, the prosecutor’s claim is that
since I downloaded it from a peer to peer network called Shareza,
that constitutes reproducing which constitutes the pandering
charges. . . .
There isn’t a day that goes by that I don’t think that it would be better
if I just killed myself. I have a wife and five children whom I love
very much. I can’t help but think that they would be better off
without me around to bring them down with all of this. However, I
keep being reminded that my kids need a dad and what would they
do if I were gone forever. It is hard enough on them right now and
I’ve been away from them for a couple of months. . . .
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The media destroys you and doesn’t care about reporting the whole
story, just what will make sensational headlines. I had an eighty
thousand dollar a year job that was gone in an instant when the story
hit the airwaves. I had not even been to court yet or convicted. Just
the accusation was enough in their eyes. Even though we don’t have
everything we once had, we have all stuck together through this and
plan on getting through this whole ordeal together. . . .
In August of this year, I was taken to the county jail and on my first
day there, three guys came into my cell stating that they saw me on
the news and they were going to get me. My cell was locked down
but on the fourth day I had returned to my cell after lunch and laid
down. Central forgot to lock the cell so . . . those three came in and
beat me up. All three of them were in for murder. It is pretty bad
that I am looked at worse than a murderer when I never touched a
child or ever intended to touch a child. I downloaded from the
internet while one of these men killed his girlfriend then enlisted his
friends to help him cut up her body and scatter the parts in Kentucky.
Yet after the media attention, society feels I deserve this and worse.
The comments people left about the articles ha[ve] really scared my
wife. . . .
I have no criminal record, did not use any type of drug, and have
worked hard to support my family. I have five wonderful children
that depend on me and would be hurt the most if I am sentenced to
prison. My wife will have a difficult time raising and supporting
them if I am in prison. She has already had to deal with so much
from this. She has had to face community ridicule for standing by
me and virtual strangers demanding to know why she didn’t
immediately leave me.
Letter from D. L., undated, filed in United States v. Polouizzi, No. 6-CR-22, ECF No. 347-1.
A mother wrote:
[M]y son was sentenced to a fifteen year federal mandatory
minimum sentence for possession of child pornography. At first the
stuff came attached to a movie he was downloading from a site
called Limewire. He couldn’t delete it. He tried. Instead he did
something stupid, he found it useful to bargain for movies he
wanted. That was in 2003. When the North Carolina SBI came to
his home, confiscated his computer and all his CDs, they suggested
he get an attorney. He did. Absolutely nothing happened until five
years later when he was living with me in NJ. During that five year
period, he continued to work, care for his children and go about his
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day to day business. His company folded, he lost his job and he
checked with the attorney to see if it would be okay to move to NJ
to find better employment and be with family. Not a problem
because there were no charges and he had never been arrested. Then
one early morning a group of five federal marshals burst into my
home, arrested him on a federal warrant that had been issued a day
or so before, and he was taken to Newark to be charged and indicted
on possession of child pornography. . . .
He has a wife and 2 children here in NJ, the oldest child is autistic
attending a special school. On September 10, 2009 he went before
a federal judge in Newark . . . . She had reviewed his case, noted no
prior trouble with the law, noted a psychological evaluation by a
prominent psychologist . . . who works with sex offenders and
testifies regularly, and who found that [my son] did not fit the profile
of a pedophile and would not in his professional opinion reoffend.
She noted all the family support he had as we were all there for him.
She indicated that she didn’t quite understand the technical aspects
of the charges, but she was bound by a federal guideline of
sentencing to fifteen years, no parole, nothing. She recommended
his time be served in NJ or PA so family could keep in touch. Again
this is a man, 43, who spent his married life devoted to his children,
his family and his work and was now being sent away for fifteen
years because of a mandatory minimum sentence that doesn’t allow
a judge to change a federal mandatory minimum, nor to take into
consideration all the extenuating circumstances. His wife and
children are now on public assistance at NJ expense. They are living
with me to keep them together. He was soon sent from Newark,
Essex County Prison to [the Metropolitan Detention Center] in
Brooklyn where he waited until there was an opening hopefully in
Fort Dix, here in NJ. Well, would you believe he was first sent to a
county prison in Oklahoma where he sat for a few days before being
sent to his final destination in Bastrop FCI in Bastrop, Texas. Now
he was told he had to “earn” his way back to NJ.
Letter from S. C., June 25, 2010, filed in United States v. Polouizzi, No. 6-CR-22, ECF No. 2643.
Upon release from prison, many inmates “have a difficult time reestablishing their
relationships with their children.”

Jenni Vainik, The Reproductive and Parental Rights of

Incarcerated Mothers, 46 Fam. Ct. Rev. 670, 680 (2008) (footnote omitted); see also United States
64

v. G.L., 305 F.R.D. 47, 50 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). Reconnecting with family and loved ones may be
particularly hard for convicted sex offenders, because of the stigma associated with the offense as
well as the strict restrictions imposed upon release. See 42 U.S.C. § 16913 (federal sex offender
registration and notification requirements); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) (supervised release term for
federal sex offenders); see also N.Y. Correct. Law § 168 et seq. (New York state’s sex offender
registration act may also apply to federal child pornography offenders residing in New York state
pursuant to § 168-a (2)(d)(iii)).
A mother wrote:
I write as the mother of a young man (20 years old at the time of his
single offense) convicted of 1 count of possession of child
pornography. That was 7 years ago, and he has served his sentence
(4 years) and completed his supervised release (3 years) and his
court-ordered “therapy.” He struggles day-to-day to find work,
housing, to maintain his sense of self-worth, his dignity, to find
some hope for the future for himself and his lovely new bride. He
is held back enormously because he is on the public registry.
I don’t excuse what he did, I never did, and neither does he. But I
believe . . . that there is an enormous difference between viewing
[child pornography] obtained via file sharing by naïve young men
and the actual, intentional molestation/abuse of a child. I know
many, many other mothers of sons like my own; good kids who were
guilty of hubris, of a lack of empathy, of an unhealthy curiosity and
in most cases, an obsession with pornography of all types that took
them places they should not have gone. NONE of the young men I
know ever touched a child.
Letter from R. G. R., Oct. 1, 2013, filed in United States v. Polouizzi, No. 6-CR-22, ECF No. 3601.
The parents of a young man incarcerated for downloading child pornography wrote:
We are writing to you today to share our story and the story of many
like us that have been impacted under the Federal Guidelines for
possession of child pornography. We do not in any way condone
the exploitation of children.
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Our story is similar to so many across the country. Our son
downloaded child pornography to a shared file from Lime Wire. He
did not actively send these images, pay for them, have contact or
have any prior convictions. He received an 8-year sentence under
enhancement guidelines. We fully understand what our son did was
wrong. Yet, it does not seem in any way productive to my son’s
psychological betterment to undergo 8 years of imprisonment.
There will be nothing that can change the pain and shame of what
our son viewed. The void in our lives cannot be described. It has
been two years since his incarceration and we ache for the day we
can be a family again.
Many others have husbands incarcerated for lengthy sentences who
actually fear reuniting with their families when released. As
permanent felons and permanently registered sex offenders with
residency and employment restrictions, they fear imposing
additional burdens, shame, and subsequent trauma on their wives
and children by living under the same roof. This extinguishes any
possible pathway to repairing these marriages and families.
Until reunited with our loved ones, we are dedicated to putting our
energies into preventing others from going through this hell alone[.]
Letter from H. F. and R. F., Feb. 3, 2011, filed in United States v. Polouizzi, No. 6-CR-22, ECF
No. 315-2.
A convict revealed:
I am currently in the federal prison in Forrest City, Arkansas serving
a 51-month federal sentence and a 7-year Missouri sentence for
possession of child pornography. . . .
At the same time, my conditions upon release are like a sentence by
themselves. When I leave the Federal Bureau of Prisons, I shall
have lifetime supervised release, for which I shall have to pay; I shall
never be allowed, even for work or school, to use a computer or any
device with Internet, and I shall need to register as a sex offender
both in the State of Missouri’s and the national registry. Of course,
with the recent Supreme Court ruling that sex offenders can be
detained [indefinitely], I may not have to worry about being
released.
To me, it seems like the thousands of men in my position will have
great difficulties in their effort to return to society. In my case, I
was a university Spanish instructor for three years and am interested
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in earning a doctoral degree in order to get my life back on track.
Unfortunately, that is impossible without the use of a computer. I
cannot think of many careers for which I am still eligible, and I know
others in the same situation.
Letter from P. L., undated, filed in United States v. Polouizzi, No. 6-CR-22, ECF No. 271-2.
VI. Sentencing Law
Discretion of Sentencing Judge in Determining Appropriate Punishment
A high degree of discretion is possessed by the sentencing judge in determining appropriate
punishment. See, e.g., United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 188 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“A
sentencing judge has very wide latitude to decide the proper degree of punishment for an individual
offender and a particular crime.”). It is the sentencing court that “is in the best position to judge
the appropriateness of a sentencing departure in light of the defendant’s overall history and
character, his remorse or lack of it, and other factors bearing on the sentence to be imposed.”
United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 421 (2d Cir. 2003); see also United States v. D.M., 942 F.
Supp. 2d 327, 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
Applicable Statute
As already noted, defendant pled guilty to possession of child pornography in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B):
Any person who . . . knowingly possesses, or knowingly accesses
with intent to view, 1 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films,
video tapes, or other matter which contain any visual depiction that
has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported using any means
or facility of interstate or foreign commerce . . . by any means
including by computer, if – (i) the producing of such visual depiction
involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
and (ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct[.]
Because defendant was convicted of a crime of possession of child pornography (rather
than one of production, receipt or distribution), no statutory minimum mandatory term of
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imprisonment is applicable. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2) (2012). The maximum term in prison is
twenty years if the person depicted is under twelve years old. Id. He is subject to a minimum term
of supervised release of five years. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) (2015).
In the absence of a mandatory statutory minimum sentence, a district court must consider a
variety of factors when determining the appropriate punishment. See, e.g., Ewing v. Cal., 538 U.S.
11, 34-35 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[B]efore guideline sentencing became so prevalent[,]
. . . sentencing judges wisely employed a proportionality principle that took into account all of the
justifications

for

punishment—namely,

deterrence,

incapacitation,

retribution,

and

rehabilitation.”).
Advisory Nature of the Sentencing Guidelines
A district court determines the applicable sentencing range pursuant to the United States
Sentencing Commission Guidelines (“Guidelines”). See Dorvee., 616 F.3d at 180 (citing Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 39 (2007)). In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court determined
that the Guidelines are advisory. 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005). Although no longer mandatory,
the Guidelines’ sentencing ranges continue to function as “the starting point and the initial
benchmark” for all sentencing proceedings. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 46, 49 (noting that the
Guidelines are presumed to be “the product of careful study based on extensive empirical evidence
derived from the review of thousands of individual sentencing decisions”). Even if advisory only,
the Guidelines must be given “respectful consideration” by the sentencing court. See Kimbrough
v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007).
1. Section 3553(a) Factors
After consulting the Guidelines, a sentencing court performs an “individualized
assessment” of the situation. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. This analysis is guided by “[r]easonableness”
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and an “individualized application of the statutory sentencing factors” listed in section 3553(a) of
the United States Code, Title 18. See Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 184 (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 46-47);
Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 113 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he district court is free to make its own
reasonable application of the § 3553(a) factors, and to reject (after due consideration) the advice
of the Guidelines.”).
In view of the excessive incarceration rates in the recent past and their unnecessary,
deleterious effects on individuals sentenced, society and our economy, justifiable frugality in
incarceration is prized. See, e.g., Nat’l Res. Council of the Nat’l Academies, The Growth of
Incarceration in the United States, Exploring Causes and Consequences, 8 (2014) (“Parsimony:
the period of confinement should be sufficient but not greater than necessary to achieve the goals
of sentencing policy.”). Pursuant to the “parsimony clause” in section 3553(a), a court is to
“impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary to comply with the specific purposes
set forth” at section 3553(a)(2). 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see also Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 182.
Section 3553(a) includes a list of “factors” a court is to consider when determining the
appropriate sentence (“the § 3553(a) factors”). They are as follows:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect
for the law; and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;
and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner;
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(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established [by
the Guidelines;]
(5) any pertinent policy statements [issued by the Sentencing
Commission;]
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
2. Departures Based on Section 3553(b)(2) Factors
Although no longer mandatory, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2) provides guidance on instances in
which district courts may upwardly or downwardly depart from the Guidelines for crimes relating
to children or sexual offenses. See United States v. Selioutsky, 409 F.3d 114, 116-17 (2d Cir. 2005)
(considering the excising of § 3553(b)(2) under the rationale set forth in Booker).
Under § 3553(b)(2), sentencing courts may upwardly depart from the Guidelines if “there
exists an aggravating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a
sentence greater than that described.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2)(A)(i); see also U.S.S.G. §
5K2.0(a)(1)(B).
According to § 3553(b)(2), sentencing courts may downwardly depart from the Guidelines,
in addition to refusing to follow them, if:
(ii) the court finds that there exists a mitigating circumstance of a
kind or to a degree, that—
(I)

has been affirmatively and specifically identified as
a permissible ground of downward departure in the
sentencing guidelines or policy statements issued
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under section 994(a) of title 28, taking account of any
amendments to such sentencing guidelines or policy
statements by Congress;
(II)

has not been taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines; and

(III)

should result in a sentence different from that
described; or

(iii) the court finds, on motion of the Government, that the defendant
has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or
prosecution of another person who has committed an offense and
that this assistance established a mitigating circumstance of a kind,
or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should
result in a sentence lower than that described.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii).
3. Departures Based on Disagreement with Commission Policy
A sentencing court need not follow the sentencing range suggested by the Guidelines if it
disagrees with a relevant policy reflected in the Guidelines. See Spears v. United States, 555 U.S.
261, 264 (2009) (stating that “the point of Kimbrough” was to “recogni[ze] [the] district courts’
authority to vary from the crack cocaine Guidelines based on policy disagreement with them, and
not simply based on an individualized determination that they yield an excessive sentence in a
particular case”). This authority “is at its greatest when the offense Guideline at issue is not the
product of the Commission’s empirical analysis and technical expertise.” United States v. Diaz,
No. 11-CR-821, 2013 WL 322243, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2013). This is the case with respect
to the Guidelines for child pornography offenses, which were amended at the direction of Congress
rather than through the Sentencing Commission’s empirical approach. See Dorvee, 616 F.3d at
184-86. The Commission opposed some changes to the Guidelines directed by Congress and has
sought authority from Congress to amend the current child pornography provisions. See id. at 185;
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U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Federal Child Pornography Offenses, at 322 (“[T]he Commission
believes that Congress should enact legislation providing the Commission with express authority
to amend the current guideline provisions that were promulgated pursuant to specific congressional
directives or legislation directly amending the guidelines.”).
4. Departures: Statement of Reasons Required
A sentencing court shall “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular
sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). If the sentence is not of the kind prescribed by, or is outside the
range of, the Guidelines referred to in section 3553(a)(4), the court shall indicate the specific
reasons for imposing a sentence different from the Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). These
“reasons must also be stated with specificity in a statement of reasons form.” Id. Even though,
pursuant to Booker, the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, the sentencing court must still adhere
to the requirements of section 3553(c)(2). United States v. Jones, 460 F.3d 191, 196-97 (2d Cir.
2006).
The sentencing court’s written statement of reasons shall be “a simple, fact-specific
statement explaining why the Guidelines range did not account for a specific factor or factors under
§ 3553(a).” United States v. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated in part on
other grounds by Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007).

A statement should

demonstrate that the court “considered the parties’ arguments and that it has a reasoned basis for
exercising its own legal decision-making authority.” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 193 (quoting Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)) (internal alterations omitted).
Restitution
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2259, victims of certain child exploitation offenses, including
possession of child pornography, are entitled to mandatory restitution. The statute provides, in
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relevant part, that the order of restitution “shall direct the defendant to pay the victim (through
the appropriate court mechanism) the full amount of the victim’s losses.” 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1).
The term “full amount of the victim’s losses” includes any costs
incurred by the victim for: (A) medical services relating to physical,
psychiatric, or psychological care; (B) physical and occupational
therapy or rehabilitation; (C) necessary transportation, temporary
housing, and child care expenses; (D) lost income; (E) attorney’s
fees, as well as other costs incurred; and (F) any other losses suffered
by the victim as a proximate result of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3).
In Paroline v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the question of how to
determine the proper amount of restitution that “a possessor of child pornography must pay to the
victim whose childhood abuse appears in the pornographic materials possessed.” 134 S. Ct. 1710,
1716 (2014). The Court held that “[r]estitution is . . . proper under § 2259 only to the extent the
defendant’s offense proximately caused a victim’s losses.” Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1722. The
Court then determined that, in a case in which a defendant possesses images of a victim and the
victim has outstanding losses caused by the continuing traffic in
those images but where it is impossible to trace a particular amount
of those losses to the individual defendant[,] . . . a court applying §
2259 should order restitution in an amount that comports with the
defendant’s relative role in the causal process that underlies the
victim’s general losses.
Id. at 1727. In a case like Paroline, where the defendant possessed two images of “Amy”—the
victim seeking restitution—and was one of potentially thousands of people possessing her images,
the Court noted that although any award should not be “a token or nominal amount,” restitution
“would not be severe . . . given the [weak] nature of the causal connection between the conduct
of a possessor like Paroline and the entirety of the victim’s general losses from the trade in her
images, which are the product of the acts of thousands of offenders.” Id.
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In terms of how courts should go about calculating such an award, the Court noted that
“[t]his cannot be a precise mathematical inquiry and involves the use of discretion and sound
judgment.” Id. at 1728. Specifically, a court should “assess as best it can from available evidence
the significance of the individual defendant’s conduct in light of the broader causal process that
produced the victim’s losses.” Id. at 1727-28. As a starting point, the Court suggested that district
courts “determine the amount of the victim’s losses caused by the continuing traffic in the victim’s
images,” and “then set an award of restitution in consideration of factors that bear on the relative
causal significance of the defendant’s conduct in producing those losses.” Id. at 1728. The Court
then identified a variety of factors that district courts could take into consideration when
determining proper restitution, including:
[T]he number of past criminal defendants found to have contributed
to the victim’s general losses; reasonable predictions of the number
of future offenders likely to be caught and convicted for crimes
contributing to the victim’s general losses; any available and
reasonably reliable estimate of the broader number of offenders
involved (most of whom will, of course, never be caught or
convicted); whether the defendant reproduced or distributed images
of the victim; whether the defendant had any connection to the initial
production of the images; how many images of the victim the
defendant possessed; and other facts relevant to the defendant’s
causal role.
Id.
The Supreme Court cautioned that “[t]hese factors need not be converted into a rigid
formula, especially if doing so would result in trivial restitution orders.” Id. Rather, the factors
are to serve as “rough guideposts for determining an amount that fits the offense.” Id.
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VII.

Application of Law to Facts
Guidelines Sentencing Range
The total Guidelines offense level is 28. The criminal history category is I, yielding a

Guidelines imprisonment range of 78-97 months. U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (Nov. 2014); see also Sent.
Hr’g. The offense level was calculated by the probation department as follows:


Base offense level of 18 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2;



Two-level enhancement because the material involved a prepubescent minor who
had not attained the age of 12 years old, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(2);



Four-level enhancement because it was deemed that the offense involved the
portrayal of sadistic and/or masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence,
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4);



Two-level enhancement because the offense involved the use of a computer or
interactive computer service, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(6);



Five-level enhancement because the offense involved 22 videos (amounting to
1,650 images) and 9 still images for a total of 1,659 images, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
2G2.2(b)(7)(D);



Two-level reduction because defendant demonstrated acceptance of responsibility
for the offense, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a);



One-level reduction because the government was informed in a timely manner of
defendant’s intention to plead guilty, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).

PSR at 5-6.
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The probation department viewed the sentencing range provided under the Guidelines as
excessive and recommended a sentence of 24 months in custody with a term of five years of
supervised release. U.S. Prob. Dep’t Sent. Rec., Oct. 17, 2014 (sealed), at 3.
Analysis of Section 3553(a) Factors
A sentencing court is required to carry out an individualized assessment in order to reach a
sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply” with the requirements of
the § 3553(a) factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
1. Nature and Circumstances of Offense; History and Characteristics of
Defendant
The individual circumstances of the case were analyzed, including the nature of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the defendant. A non-incarceratory sentence is appropriate.
Defendant is a father to three young children who would be severely adversely affected if he were
incarcerated. ACS conducted an investigation and concluded there was no evidence that any of
R.V.’s children had been abused by him. See supra Part II.F. Upon completion of the study,
defendant was permitted by New York’s Family Court to return home to reside with his family on
August 29, 2014. PSR at ¶ 11; Sent. Mem., Apr. 9, 2015, ECF No. 43 (sealed), at 1 and Ex. D;
Hr’g Tr., Apr. 1, 2015, 94:18-20. The family court petition was dismissed on May 6, 2015. Letter
update as to [R.V.], June 10, 2015, ECF No. 51 (sealed).
The expert, Dr. Krueger, testified that, in his opinion, not only could his children safely live
with R.V., but they would be negatively affected if they were to be separated from their father:
It is my opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that
[R.V.] could live with his family without placing his children at risk.
Indeed, given the negative effects of this separation from his
children, it is my opinion that it would be in the children’s best
interest to be reunited with them.
76

Krueger Letter at 12; see also Hr’g Tr., Apr. 1, 2015, at 63:16-18; supra Part III.A.3.b. Ms.
Guevara, a social worker, also testified that the defendant belongs to a strong family unit and his
children would suffer from his absence. See supra Part III.B; Hr’g Tr., Apr. 1, 2015, at 19:19-21;
Family Assessment at 6 (“[R.V.’s] presence and participation in the home is vital to this family’s
healing and progress . . . .”).
Defendant has expressed sincere remorse for his actions and has fully participated in
treatment, making adequate progress. See supra Part II.E. His treatment provider noted that, given
R.V.’s “commitment to treatment and his ability to work on improving his recognition of his
personal high risk factors he appears capable [of] maintaining a non-relapse behavior.” Mustard
Seed Client Compliance Report, Apr. 1, 2015, Ct. Ex. 2, at 3. Dr. Krueger agreed that continued
participation in a treatment program under federal supervision would have a “substantial impact
upon decreasing” any risk of re-offense. See Hr’g Tr., Apr. 1, 2015, at 53:11-54-12; see also
Krueger Letter at 12. A non-incarceratory sentence under strict supervised release conditions
would allow defendant to continue benefiting from treatment opportunities while also supporting
his family.
2. Purposes of Sentencing
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), any sentence imposed must: reflect the seriousness of
the offense; promote respect for the law; provide just punishment for the offense; afford adequate
deterrence to criminal conduct; protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and provide
the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2); see also D.M., 942 F. Supp. 2d at
345-46. The likelihood that defendant “will engage in future criminal conduct [is] a central factor
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that district courts must assess when imposing [a] sentence.” Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S.
476, 492 (2011); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C).
R.V. pled guilty to a felony. Possession of child pornography may contribute to the
existence of a market that harms and exploits children. The serious injury children are exposed to
does not end with the making of child pornography; instead, it is perpetuated by the continued
distribution and consumption of those images. See D.M., 942 F. Supp. 2d at 344 (“Continued
emotional violence is visited upon the victims of child pornography by the knowledge that their
abuse is being viewed and consumed by individuals like defendant.”); see also supra Part V.E.
Yet, numerous courts, as well as the Sentencing Commission itself, have recognized that the
current child pornography Guidelines do not adequately reflect the impact of the changing
technological landscape on an individual’s level of culpability. See supra Part I.A; infra Part
VII.B.4-5. As discussed in Part V.C, supra, the Internet and digital media have drastically
increased both the accessibility and volume of child pornography for online consumption. See,
e.g., U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Federal Child Pornography Offenses, at 312-13. Experts have
noted that easy access to child pornography materials online may “lead to sexual exploration that
might otherwise have remained dormant or unstimulated.” Griffin-Shelley, supra, at 323. The
Internet revolution has enabled the creation and expansion of a subgroup of sexual offenders who
are guilty of viewing child pornography, but who never have—and highly likely never will—
molest a child or otherwise engage in the production or commercial distribution of child
pornography. See supra Part V.D.
The Guidelines fail to account for this class of offenders. Several of the enhancements
applicable to defendants convicted of non-production offenses, such as the two-level enhancement
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for use of a computer, will almost always be applicable. This was recognized by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in Dorvee, when it noted that:
The § 2G2.2 sentencing enhancements cobbled together through this
process routinely result in Guidelines projections near or exceeding
the statutory maximum, even in run-of-the-mill cases. The base
offense level for distribution of child pornography, which in 1991
was 13, has been gradually increased to 22 as the Commission has
attempted to square the Guidelines with Congress’s various
directives. On top of that, many of the § 2G2.2 enhancements apply
in nearly all cases. Of all sentences under § 2G2.2 in 2009, 94.8%
involved an image of a prepubescent minor (qualifying for a twolevel increase pursuant to § 2G2.2(b)(2)), 97.2% involved a
computer (qualifying for a two-level increase pursuant to §
2G2.2(b)(6)), 73.4% involved an image depicting sadistic or
masochistic conduct or other forms of violence (qualifying for a
four-level enhancement pursuant to § 2G2.2(b)(4)), and 63.1%
involved 600 or more images (qualifying for a five-level
enhancement pursuant to § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D)).
Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 186 (internal citations omitted). The Department of Justice also acknowledged
that certain Guideline provisions, including the 2-level computer enhancement, do not adequately
distinguish between different categories of defendants.

Letter from Anne Gannon, Nat’l

Coordinator for Child Exploitation & Interdiction, to Judge Patti B. Saris 1 (Mar. 5, 2013)
(“Because the vast majority of child pornography offenses now involve the use of a computer, this
[specific offense characteristic] should be eliminated and replaced by others . . . .”).
In the present case, Dr. Krueger testified that R.V. “stumbled on” and “began viewing”
child pornography about one year prior to his arrest. At the same time, R.V. began engaging in
online chats with underage girls. See Hr’g Tr., Apr. 1, 2015, at 47:17-48:24. Dr. Krueger
performed several tests to determine R.V.’s mental condition and sexual tendencies and concluded
that R.V.’s risk of sexual violence and re-offense was “low” or “extremely low.” Krueger Letter
at 12; see also Hr’g Tr., Apr. 1, 2015, at 46:22-24. Dr. Krueger also determined that R.V. was not
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a danger to his children. Hr’g Tr., Apr. 1, 2015, at 46:18-21. This renowned expert recommended
a “non-incareratory sentence with substantial close supervision and treatment.” Hr’g Tr., Apr. 1,
2015, at 95:19-22.
R.V. has been actively engaged in treatment following his arrest. See supra Part II.E. A
satisfactory progress report provided by Mustard Seed prior to R.V.’s sentencing concluded that:
[R.V.] continues to attend and engage in treatment discussions. We
[a]re pleased with the effort he has made thus far. We are pleased
with his willingness to share as well as disclose the areas of his
sexual life that may have contributed to his acting out behavior. He
will begin to do work on improving his ability to recognize the
thoughts, feelings and actions related to his acting out behavior. We
feel the prognosis for successful treatment completion is good at this
time.
R.V. Sent. Mem., Mar. 30, 2015, ECF No. 41, at Ex. E. Dr. Krueger considered R.V.’s treatment
with Mustard Seed. He determined it was an “appropriate program,” which “will well take care
of [R.V.]” and could also assist in the “management of [R.V.’s] overall risk.” Hr’g Tr., Apr. 1,
2015 at 62:19-63:15; see also Mustard Seed Client Compliance Report, April 1, 2015, Ct. Ex. 2,
at 4 (“[W]e believe that [R.V.], if given the chance to, can benefit from community based treatment
to address his involvement in the commission of a sexually deviant act.”).
Given the credible medical testimony that, with appropriate treatment and supervision,
R.V. does not present a risk to the public, a non-incarceratory sentence with a prolonged period of
supervised release under strict conditions, including continued treatment, adequately reflects the
seriousness of the offense and serves the purposes of punishment in this case. The court considered
the government’s request that the period of supervised release “be longer than five years; at least
until the youngest child is of an age where she might be able to go to college and be out of the
house.” Sent. Hr’g Tr., at 36:9-14. In following the government’s suggestion, the court concluded
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that a supervised release period of seven years was proper. Id. at 37:17-18. The court also noted
that “[s]upervised release should be intense with requirement of treatment at the beginning and
then probation may utilize its judgment to reduce the intensity so it doesn’t interfere with the family
. . . .” Id. at 37:18-22.
In addition to the conditions of his supervised release, R.V. will be subject to prolonged
and severe sex offender registration requirements under federal law and likely also under New
York law. See 42 U.S.C. § 16913; 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k); N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-a (2)(d)(iii)
(providing that the term “sex offense” includes “a conviction of . . . any of the provisions of 18
U.S.C. 2251, 18 U.S.C. 2251A, 18 U.S.C. 2252, 18 U.S.C. 2252A, 18 U.S.C. 2260, 18 U.S.C.
2422(b), 18 U.S.C. 2423, or 18 U.S.C. 2425, provided that the elements of such crime of conviction
are substantially the same as those which are a part of such offense as of the date on which this
subparagraph takes effect.”).

Such post-release conditions represent exacting collateral

consequences which serve to deter future criminal conduct. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575
(2003) (recognizing that the “stigma” imposed for violation of sex crime statute “is not trivial”);
United States v. Mateo, 299 F. Supp. 2d 201, 209-10 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[B]eyond the offender’s
actual deprivation of liberty when incarcerated, a host of other penalties and burdens always attend
criminal conviction, to name a few: losses of family life, of socioeconomic status, of employment
and career opportunities; diminution of certain civil rights and entitlements; and countless
humiliations and indignities commonly associated with living in confinement.”); Model Penal
Code: Sexual Assault and Related Offenses, General Commentary at 12 (Am. Law. Inst.,
Discussion Draft No. 2, 2015) (“[T]he treatment of sex offenders has borne many of the hallmarks
of an unjustifiably punitive state. For instance, sex offenders as a class have been subjected to
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some of the most unforgiving and indiscriminate collateral consequences of conviction, such as
unduly severe residency restrictions or registration requirements.”).
3. Kinds of Sentences Available
Sentences actually imposed in similar cases have been considered, as required by §
3553(a)(3)-(4).

The sentencing options available to the court include combinations of the

following variables: custody followed by supervised release; probation; restitution; forfeiture; and
fines. Of critical importance is also the availability of sex offender treatment.
In this case, the sentences available were as follows: an incarceratory sentence of between
78 and 97 months pursuant to the Guidelines; a term of supervised release of five years to life; a
Guidelines fine range of $12,500 to $125,000; and a mandatory $100 special assessment. See
PSR, at Part D. The court considered all available options and determined that a sentence of timeserved of five days, seven years of strict supervised release with sex offender treatment, a $12,500
fine in addition to $2,000 in victim’s restitution and a $100 special assessment, coupled with the
continuing sex offender notification and registration requirements as provided by statute under 42
U.S.C. § 16913, amounted to appropriate punishment, for the reasons set forth herewith.
4. Guidelines, Policy, and Other Criteria of Sentencing Commission
The United States Sentencing Commission has voiced concerns with respect to the current
Guidelines’ ability to reflect varying degrees of culpability given the impact of recent
technological changes on the offense of child pornography. As explained by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in Dorvee, while the Guidelines are normally developed by the Commission
through empirical studies focused on data about past sentencing practices, this was not the case for
the child pornography offenses. Rather than being developed empirically by the Commission,
these guidelines were amended at the direction of Congress.
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The Commission opposed

increasingly harsher penalties imposed by the legislature. See Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 184-86; see
also United States Sentencing Commission, The History of the Child Pornography Guidelines,
Oct.

2009,

http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-

projects-and-surveys/sex offenses/20091030_History_Child_Pornography_Guidelines.pdf.
In 2012, the Commission completed a multi-year examination of “offenders sentenced
under the federal sentencing guidelines and corresponding penal statutes concerning child
pornography offenses.” U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Federal Child Pornography Offenses, at i. The
Commission was especially concerned with the Guidelines applicable to non-production child
pornography offenses and the extent to which they managed to meaningfully distinguish among
different offenders’ levels of culpability. As explained in the resulting report, “several factors”
prompted the Commission’s examination:
First, during the past two decades, cases in which offenders have
been sentenced under the child pornography guidelines, while only
a small percentage of the overall federal criminal caseload, have
grown substantially both in total numbers and as a percentage of the
total caseload.
Second, since the enactment of the PROTECT ACT of 2003 and
United States v. Booker, which made the guidelines “effectively
advisory” in 2005, there has been a steadily decreasing rate of
sentences imposed within the applicable guidelines ranges in nonproduction cases . . . . These sentencing data indicate that a growing
number of courts believe that the current sentencing scheme in nonproduction offenses is overly severe for some offenders . . . .
Third, as a result of recent changes in the computer and Internet
technologies that non-production offenders use, the existing
sentencing scheme in non-production cases no longer adequately
distinguishes among offenders based on their degree of culpability.
Non-production child pornography offenses have become almost
exclusively Internet-enabled crimes; the typical offender today uses
modern Internet-based technologies such as peer-to-peer (“P2P”)
file-sharing programs that were just emerging a decade ago and now
facilitate large collections of child pornography. The typical
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offender’s collection not only has grown in volume but also contains
a wide variety of graphic sexual images (including images of very
young victims), which are now readily available on the internet. As
a result, four of the six sentencing enhancements in § 2G2.2—those
relating to computer usage and the type and volume of images
possessed by offenders, which together account for 13 offense
levels—now apply to most offenders and, thus, fail to differentiate
among offenders in terms of their culpability. These enhancements
originally were promulgated in an earlier technological era, when
such factors better served to distinguish among offenders. Indeed,
most of the enhancements in § 2G2.2, in their current or antecedent
versions, were promulgated when the typical offender obtained
child pornography in printed form in the mail.
Fourth, recent social science research—by both the Commission and
outside researchers—has provided new insights about child
pornography offenders and offense characteristics that are relevant
to sentencing policy. This research includes information regarding
the prevalence of child pornography offenders’ criminal sexually
dangerous behavior both before their arrests and after their ultimate
reentry into the community following their convictions, as well as
emerging research on the efficacy of psycho-sexual treatment of
offenders’ clinical sexual disorders.
Finally, most stakeholders in the federal criminal justice system
consider the nonproduction child pornography sentencing scheme to
be seriously outmoded. Those stakeholders, including sentencing
courts, increasingly feel that they “are left without a meaningful
baseline from which they can apply sentencing principles” in nonproduction cases.
Id. at i–ii (emphasis added).
While observing that “[a]ll child pornography offenses are extremely serious because they
both perpetuate harm to victims and normalize and validate the sexual exploitation of children,”
the Commission concluded that “revisions are needed to more fully differentiate among offenders
based on their culpability and sexual dangerousness.” Id. at 311.
Recommended by the Commission was that “the non-production child pornography
sentencing scheme should be revised to account for recent technological changes in offense
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conduct and emerging social science research about offenders’ behaviors and histories, and also
to better promote the purposes of punishment by account for the variations in offenders’ culpability
and sexual dangerousness.” Id. at xvii. It also recommended that Congress “amend the statutory
scheme to align the penalties for receipt and possession offenses.” The distinction between the
conduct, according to the Commission’s review of over 2,000 non-production cases, was
“indistinguishable.” Id. at xix, xx.
A below-Guidelines sentence for a first time non-production offender which takes into
account the changing technological landscape’s impact and his family’s needs is consistent with
concerns expressed by the Sentencing Commission.
5. Unwarranted Sentence Disparities
a. Increased below-Guidelines sentences in non-production cases
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) requires an analysis of comparable sentences. While courts have
sometimes imposed sentences within and above the applicable Guideline ranges in child
pornography cases, disagreement with the current sentencing scheme has convinced an increasing
number of judges to impose sentences below those recommended by the Guidelines in nonproduction cases. See, e.g., D.M., 942 F. Supp. 2d at 347-48 (“While it is not difficult to find cases
where severe sentences within and above the Guidelines have been imposed, there is by no means
a paucity of cases where judges downwardly depart from the Guidelines. The unreasonable
harshness of the Guidelines for an offense of child pornography possession, of which defendant is
charged, has been recognized by courts and judges from across the country.”).
As illustrated by the following table, a recent survey by the Sentencing Commission
demonstrated that about seventy percent of federal judges considered the Guidelines for child
pornography possession and receipt too severe.
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U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Results of Survey of United States District Judges January 2010
through March 2010 (June 2010), at 13.
A subsequent report by the Sentencing Commission recorded an increasing trend in
sentencing below the Guidelines range for non-production cases:
A variety of stakeholders in the federal criminal justice system,
including the Department of Justice, the defense bar, and many in
the federal judiciary, are critical of the current non-production
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penalty scheme. Although these stakeholders are not unanimous
concerning the perceived flaws in the penalty scheme, many believe
that it fails to adequately differentiate among offenders based on
their culpability and sexual dangerousness, needs to be updated to
reflect recent changes in typical offense conduct associated with the
evolution of computer and Internet technologies, and is too severe
for some offenders. As a result, courts and parties increasingly have
engaged in charging and sentencing practices that have limited
many offenders’ sentencing exposure.
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Federal Child Pornography Offenses, at xii; see also id. at 165 (“The
rate of non-production cases in which sentences were imposed within the applicable guideline
range steadily fell from its high point in fiscal year 2004, at 83.2 percent of cases, to 40.0 percent
of cases in fiscal year 2010, and to 32.7 percent of cases in fiscal year 2011.”).
A strong judge-initiated trend of departing downward for defendants in child pornography
offenses has emerged in recent years:
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Jeffrey T. Ulmer, Mismatch of Guidelines and Offender Danger and Blameworthiness Departures
as Policy Signals from the Courts, 13 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 271, 275 (2014).
In departing downward, district judges nationwide have spoken out against the harsh
Guidelines sentences for child pornography offenders. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 868 F.
Supp. 2d 1202, 1211 (D.N.M. 2012) (defendant received and downloaded 580 images of child
pornography; “[Defendant]’s advisory Guideline sentence of 87 to 108 months imprisonment is
far greater than necessary to punish and deter his conduct and protect the public. This is largely
due to serious flaws in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, which was not drafted pursuant to the Sentencing
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Commission’s usual expertise, and all too frequently generates unjustly excessive terms of
incarceration.”); United States v. Marshall, 870 F. Supp. 2d 489, 491-92 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (“Under
the Guidelines, some of the recommended sentences for viewers can, with enhancements, be
higher than those for actual predators . . . . In effect, the Guidelines presume that those who view
child pornography are indistinguishable from those who actually abuse children.”); United States
v. Stark, No. 10-CR-270, 2011 WL 555437, at *7 (D. Neb. Feb. 8, 2011) (defendant downloaded
over 100 image files, and had multiple hard drives containing over 2,000 images, 5,000 videos,
and 650,000 images of child erotica; “[T]he child pornography Guidelines are driven by
Congressional directive and are not grounded in any scientific, statistical, or empirical method . .
. . Although downloading child pornography is hardly a harmless activity, it is not the equivalent
of direct physical abuse or sexual molestation of children, or production of pornography involving
children. The court finds that the ranges of imprisonment recommended under the Guidelines may
be appropriate for a sexual predator, but are not a reliable appraisal of a fair sentence in this case.”);
United States v. Price, No. 09-CR-30107, 2012 WL 966971, at *12 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2012)
(images of defendant’s daughter along with 937 still images and 21 videos of other children alleged
to be child pornography where found on defendant’s computer; “[C]hild pornography crimes fall
within a spectrum . . . . This Court finds that a below-Guideline sentence is needed in this case in
order to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities but also to avoid unwarranted sentencing
similarities among defendants convicted of dissimilar conduct.”); United States v. Cameron, No.
09-CR-00024, 2011 WL890502, at *4 (D. Me. Mar. 11, 2011) (“[Defendant] is subject to nearly a
ten-fold greater punishment for possessing images of someone else sexually abusing a minor than
he would receive if he had committed the actual abuse himself.”); United States v. Beiermann, 599
F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1105 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (defendant pled guilty to knowingly transporting,
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receiving, and possessing child pornography across state lines, in total 2,600 images of potentially
370 different victims; “This guideline, thus, blurs logical differences between least and worst
offenders, contrary to the goal of producing a sentence no greater than necessary to provide just
punishment . . . . The sentencing court must consider the need to avoid unwarranted similarities
among defendants who are not similarly situated, as well as unwarranted disparities among
defendants who are similarly situated.”); United States v. Cruikshank, 667 F. Supp. 2d 697, 702
(S.D. W. Va. 2009) (defendant convicted of possessing or knowingly accessing with intent to view
child pornography; “There is nothing redeeming or even understandable about this crime. But
judges must objectively consider whether the sentences imposed further the goals of punishment.
To do so, we must differentiate between those who create child pornography and those who
consume it . . . . In an instance of troubling irony, an individual who, sitting alone, obtained images
of sexually exploited children on his computer, could receive a higher sentence than the Guidelines
would recommend for an offender who actually rapes a child.”); United States v. Burns, No. 07CR-556, 2009 WL 3617448, at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2009) (defendant was convicted on two
counts of receiving and distributing child pornography with a “relatively small collection of illegal
images”; sentenced to 72 months, below Guidelines’ range of 235-293 months); United States v.
Meysenburg, No. 08-CR-361, 2009 WL 2948554, at *8 (D. Neb. Sept. 11, 2009) (“Possession of
pornography is the least serious of the crimes on the continuum of conduct—from possession to
distribution to production to predatory abuse—that exploit children. One who possesses child
pornography is considerably less culpable than one who produces or distributes the exploitative
materials and a possessor is a marginal player in the overall child exploitation scheme.”); United
States v. Johnson, 588 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1004-07 (S.D. Iowa 2008) (refusing to “give too much
weight to the sentencing guidelines, given their lack of empirical support” and finding that a
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sentence well below the Guidelines range was warranted); United States v. Grober, 595 F. Supp.
2d 382, 393 (D.N.J. 2008), aff’d, 624 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 2010) (defendant convicted of downloading
1500 images and 200 videos of child pornography; “§ 2G2.2 leads to a sentence that is too severe
in a downloading case. Surely congress did not intend to provide a sentencing range of 19 ½ to
20 years for a typical downloader, especially one who pleads guilty. Aside from overly punitive
sanctions for a first offender, the guidelines sentence for a typical downloader squelches the ability
of a judge to depart upward. The bottom line is that the skewed focus in § 2G2.2 on content and
the strained application to conduct . . . lead to a vision whereby the predator becomes
indistinguishable from the voyeur.”).
b. Increased non-prison sentences in possession-only cases
Courts have noted the comparatively lower culpability of defendants convicted of
possessing child pornography (as opposed to distribution, production and actual sexual abuse).
With respect to defendants convicted only of possession offenses, some courts have imposed
sentences with minimal or no incarceration. See, e.g., D.M., 942 F. Supp. 2d at 352; United States
v. Autery, 555 F.3d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming non-Guidelines sentence of five years of
probation and no period of incarceration for possession of child pornography); United States v.
Stall, 581 F.3d 276, 277-78 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming non-Guidelines sentence of one day of
incarceration followed by ten-year period of supervised release); United States v. Prisel, 316 F.
App’x 377, 378 (6th Cir. 2008) (affirming non-Guidelines sentence of one day in prison followed
by eighteen months of home confinement for possession of child pornography); United States v.
Rowan, 530 F.3d 379, 380 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirming non-Guidelines sentence of five years of
probation and no period of incarceration for possession of child pornography); United States v.
Polito, 215 F. App’x 354, 355 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (affirming non-Guidelines sentence of
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five years of probation with one year of house arrest for possession of child pornography); United
States v. Crespo-Rios, No. 08-CR-208, 2015 WL 6394256, *1 (D.P.R., Oct. 19, 2015) (holding
“that resentencing Defendant to the same sentence—that is, time served followed by a long period
of supervised release—is justified in view of each of the sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553”); United States v. Mallatt, No. 13-CR-3005, 2013 WL 6196946, at *13 (D. Neb. Nov. 27,
2013) (“sentence of time served, followed by six years of supervision with special conditions
including intensive treatment is adequate to fulfill the goals of sentencing in this case”); United
States v. Diaz, 720 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1048 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (imposing non-Guidelines sentence
of six months of incarceration followed by twelve years’ supervised release); United States v.
Meillier, 650 F. Supp. 2d 887, 887 (D. Minn. 2009) (imposing non-Guidelines sentence of one day
of confinement followed by thirty years of supervised release); United States v. Boyden, No. 06CR-20243, 2007 WL 1725402, at *10 (E.D. Mich. June 14, 2007) (imposing non-Guidelines
sentence of one day of confinement followed by three years of supervised release, the first year of
which to be served in a community correctional facility); Judgment in a Criminal Case, United
States v. Evren, No. 10-CR-131 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2013) (ECF No. 59) (imposing non-Guidelines
sentence of three years of probation for defendant who pleaded guilty to one count of possession
of child pornography); see also United States v. Morace, 594 F.3d 340, 351 n. 10 (4th Cir. 2010)
(noting “that some district courts have begun sentencing defendants convicted of possessing child
pornography to one day of incarceration followed by a term of supervised release”).
6. Restitution
In this case one victim known as “Vicky” has made a restitution request. One video of the
victim was found on defendant’s digital media. Letter re Sentencing as to [R.V.], Mar. 25, 2015,
ECF No. 40 (sealed), at 7. Attorneys for “Vicky” submitted a restitution request, as well as Victim
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Impact Statements dated December 2011, January 2013 and September 2013. The restitution
request details “Vicky’s” continuing psychological injury stemming from the ongoing
proliferation of images showing the severe abuse she was subjected to as a child. Id. at 7-8.
Following Paroline, the government suggested that the court start by “determin[ing] the
amount of the victim’s losses caused by the continuing traffic in the victim’s images.” Id. at 8
(internal quotation marks omitted). The government noted that “Vicky” estimated her current
losses at $1,085,718.09, of which she had received $678,094.61 in restitution payments. Of
“Vicky’s” total losses $407,623.48 had yet to be fulfilled through restitution. Id.
The government analyzed the Paroline factors and determined that a payment of $2,000
amounted to proper restitution in this case. Id. at 8-10 (“Notably, if one divides ‘Vicky’s’ total
loss estimate by the number of defendants with standing restitution orders involving ‘Vicky,’ plus
the instant defendant . . . the result is $2,162 per defendant ($1,085,718.09 divided by 502).”)
(footnote omitted). Defendant did not object. Sent. Hr’g at 24:6-8. Since the government’s
assessment is in accord with the Supreme Court’s decision in Paroline, this court ordered R.V. to
pay $2,000 in restitution, payable at $100 a month to the Clerk of the Court. Sent. Hr’g at 24:911, 19:20.
Policy Considerations
Child pornography is an issue that implicates deep religious beliefs, ethical considerations,
complex conceptions of sexuality—its joys and problems—evolving notions of freedom of speech,
and concerns about privacy. Our society is deeply divided on how to address child pornography.
See Daniel Beekman, Appeals Court Reverses Light Sentence Given to Queens Child Porn Perv
and Molester, N.Y. Daily News, Sept. 27, 2013, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/courtreverses-sentence-quns-perv-article-1.1468359; Lauren Garrison, Child Porn Cases Trigger New
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Debate: Judges Lack Discretion with Mandatory Sentencing, New Haven Register, Aug, 15, 2010,
http://www.nhregister.com/article/NH/20100815/NEWS/ 308159971; A.G. Sulzberger, Defiant
Judge Takes on Child Pornography Law, N.Y. Times, May 22, 2010, at A1 (“There is little public
sympathy for collectors of child pornography.”).
Strong interest in child pornography as an American legislative problem emerged in the
late 1970s. In response to growing public concern, Congress enacted the Protection of Children
Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977. Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-52, 2256 (2006)). With each passing decade, Congress has
increased criminal sanctions, casting a wider and finer net. See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, The
History of the Child Pornography Guidelines (2009) at 6-9; Carol S. Streiker, Lessons from Two
Failures: Sentencing for Cocaine and Child Pornography under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines in the United States, 76 Law & Contemp. Probs. 27, 37 (2013) (“From the inception of
the Guidelines in 1987, the treatment of child pornography has been a one-way ratchet, repeatedly
turned by Congress.”); see also Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2006)); PROTECT Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003); Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. According to one scholar, the “punitive stance” of Congress stems
from noting “moral panic about sexual exploitation of children.” Hamilton, supra, at 547.
The Sentencing Commission has repeatedly requested that Congress review sentencing for
child pornography cases, particularly the imposition of mandatory minimums.

See U.S.

Sentencing Comm’n, Federal Child Pornography Offenses, at 320-31; U.S. Sentencing Comm’n,
The History of the Child Pornography Guidelines.

Yet, Congress has not acted.

For a

congressperson, addressing child pornography is akin to stepping onto the third rail. The net result
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of congressional inaction has been that inconsistent and long sentences that destroy not only the
individual but the family and community have sometimes been ordered.
Across the country, an increasing number of federal judges have criticized changes to
sentencing laws that have effectively quadrupled defendants’ average prison term over the last
decade. See, e.g., United States v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592, 603-04 (3d Cir. 2010); see also supra
Part VII.B.5. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has recognized the dearth of data on
critical issues affecting risks, dangers, and appropriate sentences in these cases.

See,

e.g., Dorvee, 604 F.3d at 94 (finding error in sentencing court’s “apparent assumption” about link
between possession of child pornography and risk of acting out); United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d
110, 122 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding error in district court’s reliance on defendant’s history of sexual
abuse of minor and “general proclivities” of child pornographers in finding probable cause to issue
a search warrant in child pornography investigation); see also United States v. Stern, 590 F. Supp.
2d 945 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (recognizing the difference in culpability between viewing and producing
child pornography as well as the wide variation of sentences in child pornography cases).
As explained above in Part VII.B.4, Section 2G2.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines is “a
Guideline that is fundamentally different from most and that, unless applied with great care, can
lead to unreasonable sentences that are inconsistent with what § 3553 requires.” Dorvee, 616 F.3d
at 184. Following its holding in Dorvee, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
consistently held that district courts are permitted to consider a broad, policy-based challenge to
child pornography sentencing guidelines in downwardly departing. See, e.g., United States v.
Alhakk, 505 F. App’x 51, 55 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he court noted that it had given ‘special
consideration’ to the concerns expressed in Dorvee . . . . Based on all of these considerations, the
court concluded that a below-Guidelines sentence . . . was sufficient but not greater than necessary
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to fulfill the requirements of § 3553(a).”); United States v. Chow, 441 F. App’x 44, 45 (2d Cir.
2011) (“Dorvee recognizes district courts’ post-Booker authority to ‘vary from the Guidelines
range based solely on a policy disagreement with the Guidelines,’ and encourages courts to take
seriously that discretion ‘in fashioning sentences under § 2G2.2’ for child pornography
defendants.”); United States v. Tutty, 612 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 2010) (defendant possessed
between 150 and 300 digital images of child pornography and he received and distributed these
images using a file sharing program; “[T]he district court should . . . bear in mind that the
‘eccentric’ child pornography Guidelines, with their ‘highly unusual provenance,’ ‘can easily
generate unreasonable results’ if they are not ‘carefully applied.’”) (citing Dorvee, 604 F.3d at 98).
Other circuits have also declared that “district courts may vary from the child pornography
guidelines . . . based on policy disagreement with them, and not simply based on individualized
determination that they yield an excessive sentence in a particular case.” U.S. v. Henderson, 649
F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 2011).
The United States Department of Justice has expressed concern with the current
Guidelines’ failure to afford proper punishment for child pornography offenses and has requested
the Sentencing Commission to revise the Guidelines, writing: “the evolution of the child
pornography ‘market’ ha[s] led to a significantly changed landscape—one that is no longer
adequately represented by the existing sentencing guidelines.” Letter from Anne Gannon, Nat’l
Coordinator for Child Exploitation & Interdiction, to Judge Patti B. Saris 1 (Mar. 5, 2013).
“Rationales for child pornography Guidelines for non-production offenses have been
shredded.” D.M., 942 F. Supp. 2d at 352. A below-Guidelines sentence in the instant case is
supported by concerns expressed by federal appellate courts and district courts, as well as the
Sentencing Commission and the United States Department of Justice. It is recognized that the
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child pornography Guidelines are “fundamentally different from most and . . . , unless applied with
great care, can lead to unreasonable sentences that are inconsistent with what § 3553 requires.”
Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 184. Acceptance of this fact enhances a sentencing court’s ability to properly
comply with its duty to impose sentences that reflect the statutory goals of sentencing and are
based on a required individualized assessment of the facts presented.
VIII.

Conclusion
A non-incarceratory sentence with a period of seven years of strict supervised release and

treatment is appropriate in this case. Given the individual characteristics of this defendant and his
family, the sentence strikes an appropriate balance between general and specific deterrence
concerns and the need for rehabilitation.
Removing R.V. from his family will not further the interests of justice; it will cause serious
harm to his young children by depriving them of a loving father and role model, and will strip R.V.
of the opportunity to heal through continued sustained treatment and the support of his close
family.
Defendant has been deemed to pose little or no risk to society. The probation department
is directed to closely supervise him to ensure that the public is protected. R.V.’s conditions of
release may be altered in case of any deviation from his present wholesome life.

SO ORDERED.
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